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Abstract 
We examine whether analysts use information in well-known stock return anomalies when making 
recommendations. We find results contrary to the common view that analysts are sophisticated 
information intermediaries who help improve market efficiency. Specifically, when analysts make 
more favorable recommendations to stocks classified as overvalued, these stocks tend to have 
particularly large negative abnormal returns ex post. Moreover, analysts whose recommendations 
are more aligned with anomaly signals are more skilled and elicit greater recommendation 
announcement returns. Our results suggest that analysts’ biased recommendations could be a 
source of market frictions that impede the efficient correction of mispricing. 
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“Wall Street analysts know their companies. You should cut a research report in two. The first 
part, the information about the company and its prospects, is probably pretty good. The second 
part, the recommendation, should be used as kindling. We use analyst information, but we don’t 
use the recommendations very often.”  David Dreman 
 
1. Introduction 
A long-standing debate in the finance and accounting literature concerns whether security 
analysts’ research helps to improve stock market efficiency. Early studies that examine market 
reactions to analyst earnings forecast revisions or recommendation changes tend to support the 
notion that analysts are skilled information processors (Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001). 
Analysts’ information-production role helps to improve price efficiency. However, recent studies 
question the usefulness of analyst research outputs, arguing that analysts’ incentives to gain 
investment-banking business, to generate trading commissions, or to curry favor with management 
for access to private information compromise their integrity and objectivity (Lin and McNichols, 
1998; Chen and Matsumoto, 2006; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy, 2006). More generally, 
Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) find that a firm’s level of external financing is a more 
important driver of analyst optimism than existing investment banking ties. This suggests that even 
unaffiliated analysts may upwardly bias their forecasts or recommendations in anticipation of 
future business. In addition to conflicts of interest arising from investment banking/brokerage 
affiliations, analyst recommendations or forecasts may be biased for non-strategic reasons (La 
Porta, 1996).  
In this paper, we address this important question by examining whether analysts exploit well-
documented stock return anomalies when making recommendations. Over the past several decades, 
researchers have discovered numerous cross-sectional stock return anomalies. Irrespective of the 
sources of return predictability, these anomalies represent publically available information, of 
which skilled agents, such as analysts, should be able to take advantage. If analysts are truly 
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sophisticated, informed, and unbiased, they should exploit such well-known sources of return 
predictability when making recommendations.1 
We propose two competing views on analyst research that offer opposite predictions to our 
research question. The sophisticated analyst hypothesis predicts that analysts should on average 
tilt their recommendations to be consistent with anomaly prescriptions. In contrast, the biased 
analyst hypothesis suggests that analyst recommendations are unrelated or even contradictory to 
anomaly prescriptions. More importantly, the two competing hypotheses have different asset 
pricing implications when analyst recommendations disagree with anomaly prescriptions. The 
sophisticated analyst hypothesis predicts that when analyst recommendations contradict anomaly 
prescriptions, anomaly stocks should not be associated with future abnormal returns. In sharp 
contrast, the biased analyst hypothesis predicts that anomaly returns can be amplified when 
analysts disagree with anomaly prescriptions, especially if certain groups of investors naïvely or 
strategically follow analyst recommendations.2 In other words, biased analyst recommendations 
are a potential source of market frictions that contribute to sustained mispricing.  
Following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012; 2015), we construct 11 prominent asset pricing 
anomalies using the sample with available analyst recommendation data from the Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). We first show that during our sample period of 1993-2014, 
all long-short portfolios based on these 11 anomalies generate significant Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor alphas, ranging from 0.35% to 1.09% per month. Following Stambaugh and Yuan 
(2017), we also create two composite mispricing scores, MGMT and PERF, which generate 
                                                          
1 We focus on analyst recommendations because they directly reflect analysts’ view of the relative over- or under-
valuation of a stock, while analysts’ forecasts of firm earnings do not directly correspond to their perception of relative 
misevaluation.  
2 Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2007) and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) find that small investors naïvely 
follow analyst recommendations, without accounting for analysts’ biased incentives. Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2014) 
show that mutual funds tend to herd into with consensus sell-side analyst upgrades, and herd out of stocks with 
consensus downgrades, and that herding by career-concerned fund managers is price destabilizing.  
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monthly three-factor alphas of 0.86% and 0.99%, respectively.3 This strong return predictability 
suggests that anomaly signals should be part of the information set that analysts can use when 
making their stock recommendations. 
To examine whether analysts incorporate anomaly signals into their recommendation 
decisions, we analyze the level and change of analyst recommendations during the window of 
anomaly portfolio formation.4 The results strongly reject the sophisticated analyst hypothesis. First, 
not only do analysts fail to tilt their recommendations to take advantage of anomalies, but also 
their recommendations are often contradictory to anomaly predictions. This tendency is 
particularly strong for anomalies related to equity issuance and investment. For example, for 
MGMT, the mean recommendation value is 4.09 for stocks in the short leg and 3.53 for stocks in 
the long leg with a difference of -0.56, which is highly significant. By contrast, analyst 
recommendations seem to be more consistent with the prescriptions of the anomalies associated 
with firm performance (PERF), such as gross profitability and return on assets, although the 
relation is weak and not monotonic. The results are similar for recommendation changes, which is 
particularly puzzling. It suggests that analysts are actively revising opinions on anomaly stocks, 
but their views tend to be in the wrong direction of anomaly predictions. Thus, analyst inattention 
or stale recommendation story cannot fully explain our findings.  
The differential analyst behavior across the two categories of anomalies is consistent with 
previous literature that finds that analysts tend to issue overly optimistic growth forecasts or 
recommendations for firms characterized with high growth, large capital spending, and equity 
financing needs. These firms are more likely to be potential investment banking clients of the 
                                                          
3 MGMT mainly consists of anomalies related to managerial actions, and PERF mainly consists of anomalies related 
to firm performance. 
4  We measure the change of recommendations by taking the difference between the current consensus 
recommendation and its value one year ago. 
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brokerage firms employing the analysts. Analysts are also likely to issue more favorable 
recommendations for better performing firms with high profitability or past winners.  
However, analyst recommendation behavior itself is not sufficient to distinguish between the 
two competing hypotheses. Analysts may have superior (private) information such that even when 
their recommendations contradict anomaly prescriptions, the information value of their 
recommendations can offset that of anomalies. We therefore examine anomaly returns when 
analyst recommendations confirm or contradict anomaly signals. The result reveals the same 
message. When analyst recommendations and anomaly prescriptions contradict, anomaly returns 
are amplified, especially for the anomalies associated with PERF. The abnormal returns in 
inconsistent cases are larger than those in consistent cases for all 11 anomalies, and significantly 
so for 7 anomalies. For example, the long-short portfolio based on PERF generates a monthly 
three-factor alpha of 1.57% for the inconsistent case, whereas it is only 0.90% for the consistent 
case. The result is more pronounced in the short leg of anomalies with favorable recommendations, 
which earns a particularly large negative return. This is consistent with the idea that short selling 
overvalued stocks is costlier than correcting underpriced stocks (Nagel, 2005; Stambaugh et al., 
2015), especially when betting against analyst consensus. The amplification effect of analyst 
recommendations on anomalies is not driven by other firm characteristics. The result from Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) regressions is similar, as we also control for standard return predictors.  
The preceding finding may mask heterogeneity across individual analysts who differ 
significantly in their skills and incentives to generate informative recommendations. To shed light 
on this issue, for each analyst we calculate the correlation between her recommendation values 
and the two composite mispricing scores among all of the stocks covered by the analyst during the 
past three years. Consistent with the idea that this correlation metric captures analysts’ skill or 
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unbiasedness, we find that analysts with a higher correlation metric elicit stronger market reactions 
when announcing recommendation changes.  
We conduct several tests to rule out alternative explanations. First, analysts may simply be 
unaware of the return predictability of these anomalies before their discoveries by academics 
(McLean and Pontiff, 2016). However, we find that analysts’ tendency to recommend overvalued 
stocks more favorably is still significant for six anomalies in the post-publication period, 
suggesting that analysts’ unawareness of expected return information in the anomalies is unlikely 
to fully explain our findings. Second, analysts can be reluctant to incorporate anomaly signals into 
their recommendations as their institutional clients can face severe constraints when trading these 
stocks. Using firm size and bid-ask spread as proxies for trading frictions, we find very similar 
results for big or highly liquid stocks, suggesting that limits-to-arbitrage concerns on the part of 
analysts is unlikely to explain our findings. Third, analyst recommendations can be strategically 
biased to cater to institutional investors’ preferences for overvalued stocks (Edelen, Ince, and 
Kadlec, 2016). However, we find very similar results for stocks partitioned by institutional 
ownership, suggesting that the catering incentive cannot fully explain our findings.  
Analyst recommendations can be biased due to misaligned incentive or behavioral bias. 
Based on the Baker-Wurgler (2006) Sentiment Index, we find that analyst recommendations are 
more biased toward overvalued stocks and that the amplification effect of biased recommendations 
on anomaly returns is more pronounced during high- rather than low-sentiment periods. This 
evidence suggests that the behavioral bias of analysts may partially explain their overly optimistic 
(pessimistic) recommendations for overvalued (undervalued) stocks.  
Using analyst data from Zacks over an earlier sample period, Barber et al. (2001) and 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) document the investment value of both the level and change of analyst 
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consensus recommendations. To reconcile their evidence with our finding that analyst consensus 
recommendations are on average inefficient, we re-examine the unconditional return predictability 
of analyst consensus recommendations. Using I/B/E/S data over the sample period from 1993 to 
2014, we do not find any return predictability for the level of analyst consensus recommendations. 
While we do find some return predictability for the change of consensus recommendations over 
the full sample period, it is concentrated only in the 1993-2000 period. Overall, we conclude that 
the seemingly contradictory results of our paper with those of prior studies are mainly attributable 
to the different sample periods studied by these papers.  
In a recent concurrent working paper, Engelberg, McLean, and Pontiff (2018b) document 
similar evidence that analysts’ price forecasts and recommendations often contradict anomaly 
predictions. Our paper differs from theirs by further showing that anomaly returns are significantly 
amplified when analyst opinions contradict anomaly signals. We thus provide stronger evidence 
that analysts’ biased recommendations contribute to the persistence of anomalies. Moreover, we 
develop a simple method to identify skilled analysts ex ante. 
 
2. Related Literature 
2.1. Cross-sectional asset-pricing anomalies 
Many stock return anomalies have been discovered over the last 40 years. Although the 
sources of return predictability of these anomalies are under debate, the large abnormal returns 
generated by some of these anomalies are well established. In this subsection, we start with the 11 
prominent anomalies extensively examined by Stambaugh et al. (2012; 2015) to shed light on the 
inference of analyst behavior and return anomalies. 
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Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) further propose two mispricing factors that are constructed 
from these 11 prominent anomalies. They begin by separating the 11 anomalies into 2 clusters 
based on the similarity in time-series anomaly returns and cross-sectional anomaly rankings. The 
first cluster consists of six anomalies: net stock issuance (NSI), composite equity issuance (CEI), 
accruals (Accrual), net operating assets (NOA), asset growth (AG), and investment to assets (I/A). 
The authors find that these variables are most likely to be directly affected by the decisions of firm 
managers. Therefore, the average ranking score based on these six anomalies reflects the 
commonality of mispricing caused by firm managers’ decisions. The authors name the pricing 
factor arising from this average ranking score as MGMT. The second cluster of anomalies includes 
gross profitability (GP), return on assets (ROA), momentum (MOM), distress (Distress), and O-
score. These five anomaly variables are more related to firm performance and less directly 
controlled by management. Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) denote the pricing factor generated from 
this cluster as PERF. We describe each anomaly in detail as follows: 
Cluster I anomalies (MGMT): 
(1) Net stock issuance (NSI): Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Pontiff and 
Woodgate (2008) find that firms issuing new shares underperform the market in the 
following three to five years. Net stock issuance is calculated as the growth rate of the split-
adjusted shares outstanding in the previous year. 
(2) Composite net equity issuance (CEI): Daniel and Titman (2006) and Fama and French 
(2008) find that firms with higher composite net equity issues earn lower future risk-
adjusted returns. The composite net equity issuance includes any actions that increase share 
issuance (such as seasoned equity offerings and share-based acquisitions) minus any 
actions that reduce share issuance (such as share repurchases). 
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(3) Accounting accruals (Accrual): Sloan (1996) documents that firms with high total 
accounting accruals subsequently earn lower risk-adjusted returns. 
(4) Net operating assets (NOA): Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) show that firms 
with higher net operating assets subsequently earn lower risk-adjusted returns. 
(5) Asset growth (AG): Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) and Titman, Wei, and Xie (2013) 
report that firms with higher growth in total assets subsequently earn lower risk-adjusted 
returns. 
(6) Investment to assets (I/A): Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008) find that firms 
with higher past investment earn lower future risk-adjusted returns. 
Cluster II anomalies (PERF): 
(7) Gross profitability (GP): Novy-Marx (2012) and Chen, Sun, Wei, and Xie (2018) show that 
firms with higher gross profits to assets earn higher risk-adjusted returns. Novy-Marx 
argues that gross profitability is the cleanest measure of true economic profitability due to 
low accounting manipulations. 
(8) Return on assets (ROA): Fama and French (2006), Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015), and Chen, 
Sun, Wei, and Xie (2018) find that firms with higher profitability or higher return on assets 
subsequently earn higher risk-adjusted returns. 
(9) Medium-term momentum (MOM): Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that firms 
performing well in the past 3-12 months continue to perform well in the next 3-12 months. 
They further find that the strategy based on the past six-month returns, skipping one month 
and holding for the next six months, is the most profitable. 
(10) Financial distress 1 (Distress): Rational theory predicts that firms with higher financial 
distress risk should earn higher returns to compensate for the risk. However, Campbell, 
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Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) and others find that firms with higher bankruptcy probability 
earn lower risk-adjusted returns. The bankruptcy probability is estimated from a dynamic 
logit model based on both accounting and equity market information. 
(11) Financial distress 2 (O-score): Campbell et al. (2008) and others find that using the Ohlson 
(1980) O-score as the distress measure produces similar results. The O-score is estimated 
from a static model using accounting data alone.  
In addition, several recent studies have examined an increasingly larger set of anomalies to 
shed further light on the sources of cross-sectional return predictability. Harvey, Liu, and Zhu 
(2016) develop a multiple hypothesis-testing framework and apply it to more than 300 factors. 
They conclude that most of the anomalies or factors discovered previously are probably false. 
Green, Hand, and Zhang (2017) find that only a small set of characteristics out of 94 are reliably 
independent determinants of cross-sectional expected returns in non-microcap stocks, and return 
predictability sharply fell after 2003. Similarly, McLean and Pontiff (2016) find that the return 
predictability of 97 variables shown to predict cross-sectional stock returns declined significantly 
post-publications, suggesting that investors learn about mispricing from academic studies. 
However, Yan and Zheng (2017) evaluate 18,000 fundamental signals from financial statements, 
show that many signals are significant predictors of cross-sectional stock returns even after 
accounting for data mining, and suggest that anomalies are better explained by mispricing. 
Engelberg, McLean, Pontiff (2018a) document that anomaly returns are many times higher on 
news dates, suggesting that anomalies are the result of investors’ biased beliefs that are partially 
corrected by the arrival of information. All of these large-scale anomaly studies contribute to our 
understanding of whether the abnormal returns documented in previous studies are compensation 
for systematic risks, evidence of market inefficiency, or simply the result of extensive data mining.  
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2.2. Usefulness and biases of analyst research 
Analysts are prominent information intermediaries in capital markets. They engage in private 
information acquisition, perform prospective analyses aimed at forecasting a firm’s future earnings 
and cash flows, and conduct retrospective analyses that interpret past events. Regulators and other 
market participants view analysts’ activities and competition between them as enhancing the 
informational efficiency of security prices. The importance of analysts’ role in capital markets has 
spurred research showing that analysts influence the informational efficiency of capital markets.  
A long-standing question in the finance and accounting literature examines whether security 
analysts’ research is useful for market participants. Early studies using short-run event windows 
to measure market reactions usually find that analyst forecasts and recommendation changes illicit 
large announcement returns. Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986) and Womack (1996) show that 
firms that receive buy (sell) recommendations tend to earn higher (lower) abnormal returns in the 
subsequent one to six months. Barber et al. (2001) extend the investigation to consensus 
recommendations. They document the potential to earn higher returns by buying the most highly 
recommended stocks and short selling the least favorably recommended stocks. Jegadeesh et al. 
(2004) find that the level of consensus recommendation adds value only to stocks with favorable 
quantitative characteristics and that the change in consensus recommendations is a more robust 
return predictor.  
However, recent studies have shown that analysts’ employment incentives create predictable 
biases in their research outputs and coverage decisions.5 For example, McNichols and O’Brien 
(1997) report that the distribution of analysts’ buy/sell recommendations is positively skewed 
                                                          
5 See, for example, Womack (1996), Bradshaw (2004), and Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011). 
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because analysts are averse to conveying negative signals. La Porta (1996) finds that analysts over-
extrapolate past growth trends and that their forecasts of long-term growth rates negatively predict 
stock returns, which contributes to the value premium. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) provide evidence 
that analyst recommendations are positively associated with some accounting, valuation, and 
growth characteristics that are negatively associated with future returns.  
Drake, Rees, and Swanson (2011) find that short sellers often trade against analyst 
recommendations and that these trades are highly profitable. Analyst incentives to misinform, 
combined with mounting evidence of market inefficiency with respect to analyst reports (i.e., the 
market’s fixation or under- or over-reactions to analyst reports), imply that analyst research cannot 
be unambiguously interpreted as serving to enhance the informational efficiency of capital markets. 
Specifically, analysts employed by brokerage houses that are affiliated with covered firms through 
an underwriting relationship issue more optimistic recommendations, earnings forecasts, and long-
term growth forecasts than do unaffiliated analysts.6 They are also less likely to reveal negative 
news.7 
Finally, several recent studies have argued that the number of analysts covering a firm is an 
informative signal for future firm fundamentals and stock returns (Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006; 
Jung, Wong, and Zhang, 2014; Lee and So, 2017). A typical security analyst faces non-trivial 
switching costs when making coverage decisions. Given their incentive structure, analysts’ choices 
of which firms to cover should reflect their true expectation of firms’ future performance.  
 
2.3. Market participants and capital market anomalies 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), and Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000). 
7 See, for example, O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005). 
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The existence and persistence of well-documented stock return anomalies have spurred a 
growing interest in investigating the underlying causes. Several recent papers argue that 
institutional investors and mutual funds in particular, through their correlated trading behavior, 
may contribute to the pervasiveness of these anomaly patterns. Jiang (2010) argues that herding 
among institutional investors contributes to the value effect. Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) find 
that institutional investors tend to trade contrary to anomaly prescriptions and that their trading 
amplifies anomaly returns. Akbas et al. (2015) find that aggregate flows into the mutual fund sector 
exacerbates well-known stock return anomalies, while aggregate flows into the hedge fund sector 
attenuate anomalies.  
With the tremendous growth of the hedge fund sector in the recent decade, studies have 
begun to examine the relation between the trading behavior of these sophisticated investors and 
anomalies. Using short interest as a proxy for arbitrage capital, Hanson and Sunderam (2014) find 
that an increase in arbitrage capital on the anomalies has resulted in lower strategy returns. Chen, 
Da, and Huang (2018) propose a measure of net arbitrage trading based on the difference between 
abnormal hedge fund holdings and abnormal short interests on a stock. They find that anomaly 
returns come exclusively from the stocks traded by arbitrageurs. Anginer, Hoberg, and Seyhun 
(2015) show that the return predictability of anomalies disappears when insider trading disagrees 
with the anomalies.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
Analyst consensus recommendations data come from the I/B/E/S summary file, while the 
individual analyst recommendations are from the I/B/E/S detail history file. The I/B/E/S detailed 
recommendation data begin in December 1992 and consensus recommendations start from 1993. 
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Recommendation value is coded as a number from 5 (strong buy) to 1 (strong sell). We also 
construct the change of consensus recommendations (∆𝑅𝑒𝑐), as Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that 
recommendation changes are more informative than recommendation levels. The recommendation 
change is calculated as the current consensus recommendation minus its value on the same firm 
one year ago. We merge the analyst data with the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
data after eliminating firms with share codes other than 10 or 11 and firms with stock prices below 
$1.  
Following Stambaugh and Yuan (2017), anomaly measures are constructed at the end of 
each month t. For the anomaly variables requiring annual financial statements from Compustat, 
we require at least a four-month gap between the portfolio formation month and the end of the 
fiscal year. For the quarterly reported earnings, we use the most recent data in which the earnings 
announcement date (RDQ in Compustat) precedes month t. For the quarterly balance sheet items, 
we use the data from the prior quarter.  
We construct anomaly portfolios as follows. We sort all of the stocks into quintile portfolios 
based on each of the anomaly characteristics at the end of each month, and define the long- and 
short legs as the extreme quintiles. When constructing the composite mispricing factors, we require 
a stock to have a non-missing value at the end of month t - 1 for at least three of the anomalies to 
be included in that composite mispricing measure. For an anomaly to be included in the composite 
mispricing measure at the end of month t - 1, we also require at least 30 stocks to have non-missing 
values for that anomaly.  
We also calculate the correlations between individual analysts’ recommendation values and 
two mispricing scores among stocks covered by the analyst, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇 and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹. To compute 
the correlations, we sort stocks into quintiles based on the recommendation value and the two 
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mispricing scores, where the highest (lowest) quintile represents the most (least) favorable analyst 
recommendations and the most undervalued (overvalued) stocks, respectively. We then calculate 
the correlation between these two ranking variables for each individual analyst in each year using 
her past three-year stock recommendations, namely: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =
∑(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖 )(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑛
𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 − 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒)
√∑(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑛 − 𝑅𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖 )
2 ∑(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑛
𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 −  𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒)2
 
(1) 
where 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 stands for MGMT or PERF. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑛 is the 𝑛
𝑡ℎ recommendation issued by analyst i in 
the past three years, ranging from 1 (least favorable) to 5 (most favorable). 𝑅𝑒𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖  is the mean of 
all recommendations issued by analyst i within the past three years. 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑛
𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
 is the mispricing 
ranking for the 𝑛𝑡ℎ stock recommendation based on the type of the composite mispricing metric 
(MGMT or PERF), ranging from 1 (overvalued) to 5 (undervalued). In addition, we keep only the 
most recent stock recommendation of an analyst for a given firm in a given year to calculate the 
correlation.  
We also construct variables suggested by the prior literature that are associated with the 
informativeness of analyst research, including analyst, recommendation, broker, and firm 
characteristics. Following Green et al. (2014), we use |∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| to stand for the magnitude 
of the recommendation revision. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  is a dummy variable that equals one if a stock 
recommendation is accompanied by earnings forecast revision and zero otherwise, based on 
Kecskés, Michaely, and Womack’s (2016) finding that stock recommendations accompanied by 
earnings forecast revisions lead to larger price reactions. Furthermore, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 
(2004) find that recommendations before (after) an earnings announcement lead to greater (weaker) 
price responses. Therefore, to control for these effects, we create a 𝑃𝑟𝑒-𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) dummy variable, which equals one if the report was issued two weeks before 
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(after) the earnings announcement and zero otherwise. 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 is a dummy variable that equals one 
if an earnings forecast revision or a recommendation change is away from consensus. This is 
motivated by Gleason and Lee (2003) and Jegadeesh and Kim (2010), who find that analyst 
earnings forecast revisions or recommendation changes that move away from the consensus (i.e., 
bold forecasts) generate larger price impacts.  
Regarding analyst characteristics, Stickel (1991) documents that recommendation changes 
made by all-star analysts have greater price impacts. Hence, we add an 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 analyst dummy 
variable. Another 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦  variable is included, as analysts with more accurate earnings 
forecasts produce more profitable recommendations (Loh and Mian, 2006). Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis (1997) emphasize the importance of analyst experiences for forecast accuracy. As a result, 
we construct two experience measures: 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 counts the number of years that an analyst has 
covered any stocks, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 counts the number of years that the analyst has covered the 
specific firm. We add 𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)  to control for the differential resources available to 
analysts employed by brokerage firms with different sizes (Clement 1999). Finally, we include 
several firm characteristics: book-to-market ratio (𝐿𝑛(𝐵/𝑀)), firm size (𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)), short-term 
reversal or past one-month returns (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡-1), volatility, past stock returns ((𝑀𝑂𝑀(-21,-1) and 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(-252,-22)), and the number of analysts following (𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒).  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all of the variables with the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, quartiles and maximum values reported. In general, these summary statistics 
are consistent with prior research. The mean value of 𝑅𝑒𝑐 is 3.76 and the median is 4, suggesting 
an overall optimism of analyst consensus recommendations (otherwise, both values should be 
close to 3). The mean of ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐 is negative (-0.08) in our sample, suggesting that analysts are more 
likely to downgrade rather than upgrade a firm. Finally, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇 is on average negative while 
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𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹  is positive, suggesting that analysts may use the information in different types of 
anomalies differently.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Informativeness of anomaly signals 
In this section, we construct the 11 prominent anomalies and examine the unconditional 
anomaly returns during the sample period when analyst recommendation data becomes available. 
We also construct two composite mispricing scores that combine the information of two groups of 
anomalies: MGMT and PERF. 
Table 2 reports the long-short portfolio returns of 11 anomalies and 2 composite mispricing 
factors. Panel A (Panel B) reports the raw returns of the MGMT (PERF) anomalies, and Panel C 
(Panel D) reports the Fama and French (1993) three-factor adjusted alphas. Overall, long-short 
portfolios based on the 11 anomalies generate significant monthly Fama and French (1993) three-
factor alphas ranging from 0.35% to 1.09%. The result suggests that anomalies contain valuable 
information about future expected returns, of which sophisticated information intermediaries, such 
as analysts, should take advantage. In addition, for most anomalies, the short leg generates much 
stronger abnormal returns than the long leg, which is consistent with the literature that short selling 
overvalued stocks is more costly and prohibitive than taking long positions on undervalued stocks 
(Nagel, 2005). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2 Analyst recommendations around the anomalies 
In this section, we examine whether analysts use anomaly information when making 
recommendations. We first sort all of the stocks into quintile portfolios based on their anomaly 
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characteristics, and then test the differences in the mean analyst consensus recommendation values 
in the long- and short legs of the portfolios. We analyze both the level and change of 
recommendations across the anomaly-sorted quintile portfolios.  
Table 3 reports the results. In Panel A, we find that stocks in the short leg of the anomalies 
receive more favorable recommendations than those in the long leg of anomalies. For example, 
the average recommendation value is 3.53 for the long leg of the composite mispricing score 
MGMT and 4.09 for its short leg. The difference of -0.56 is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
We find similar results across all individual anomalies belonging to the MGMT category. In fact, 
the level (change) of recommendation monotonically increases from the long leg to the short leg 
for almost all of the anomalies in the MGMT category. In sharp contrast, we find that the anomalies 
belonging to the PERF category suggest a different story. Analysts on average seem to issue 
recommendations consistent with these anomalies’ predictions. The mean recommendation level 
is 3.91 for the long leg of the composite mispricing score PERF and 3.72 for its short leg. The 
difference of 0.19 is statistically significant but economically small compared with the difference 
of recommendations across portfolios sorted on MGMT anomalies.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The results are similar when we examine the change of recommendations. For anomalies in 
the MGMT category, analysts are more likely to upgrade stocks in the short leg and downgrade 
firms in the long leg of the portfolios. For example, analysts downgrade recommendations by 0.06 
for the long leg of the MGMT mispricing measure and upgrade recommendations by 0.02 for the 
short leg. The difference in change of recommendations between long- and short-leg stocks is 
again highly significant. The result from the change of recommendations is particularly puzzling, 
because it suggests that analysts are actively issuing opinions on anomaly stocks, although their 
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opinions tend to be in the wrong direction of the anomaly prediction. Thus, the analyst inattention 
and stale recommendation story cannot explain our finding.  
Overall, our results suggest that analysts tend to issue more favorable recommendations to 
stocks with high investment growth and issuance needs, but also of higher profitability and past 
stock performance. Because firms with high investment rates and issuance activities have negative 
expected returns, the result suggests that analysts do not fully use the expected return information 
contained in anomalies when making stock recommendations.  
 
4.3 Anomaly returns conditional on analyst recommendations 
The inconsistence between analyst recommendation and anomaly ranking presented in the 
previous section is not sufficient to conclude that analyst recommendations are biased. Analysts 
may have superior private information beyond that contained in anomaly characteristics, so the 
information content of their recommendations may offset the information about the anomalies. To 
distinguish between the two competing views of analyst research, we must examine ex post 
anomaly returns conditional on whether analyst recommendations confirm or contradict the 
anomaly signals.  
To test this, we conduct independent double sorts of all of the stocks based on the anomaly 
signals and level of recommendations. We then take the intersection of the long leg (top 20%) and 
short leg (bottom 20%) of each anomaly with the most and least favorable terciles of 
recommendations. That is, for each anomaly, we partition the long- and short-leg portfolios into 
stocks for which the analysts have the most favorable recommendations (top one third of 
recommendations) and those for which the analysts have the most unfavorable recommendations 
(bottom one third of recommendations). We then calculate the Fama and French (1993) three-
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factor alphas for each of the four portfolios. We further construct two types of long-short portfolio: 
one for which analyst recommendations are congruent with the anomaly prescriptions (Long/Up 
– Short/Down) and another for which recommendations are contradictory to the anomaly 
predictions (Long/Down – Short/Up).8 We test the difference in the long-short portfolio returns 
between the consistent and inconsistent groups. The results with corresponding t-statistics are 
reported in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Overall, the double sort results reveal the same message. The long-short portfolio alphas are 
larger for inconsistent portfolios than consistent portfolios for all 11 anomalies, and 7 of them are 
significant. The result is particularly strong for anomalies in the PERF category. For example, the 
long-short portfolio based on the PERF composite mispricing score generates a monthly three-
factor alpha of 1.57% for the inconsistent case, while it is only 0.90% for the consistent case. The 
difference in alphas between the “inconsistent” and “consistent” groups is 0.67%, with a t-stat of 
3.17. The results from individual components of PERF are similar with the differences in alphas 
between the “inconsistent” and “consistent” groups ranging from 0.44% to 0.65%, all of which are 
statistically significant. This suggests that although analysts tend to issue recommendations that 
are on average weakly consistent with performance-related anomalies, those stocks on which they 
make “mistakes” according to anomaly signals generate particularly large abnormal returns, 
especially on the short leg. The results suggest that analysts’ biased recommendations amplify 
performance-related anomalies. For the MGMT anomalies where analyst recommendations on 
                                                          
8 More specifically, the long-short portfolio where analyst recommendations are consistent with anomaly prescriptions 
refers to the strategy that longs stocks in the long leg of the anomaly portfolio with the most favorable analyst 
recommendations and shorts stocks in the short leg of the anomaly portfolio with the least favorable analyst 
recommendations. The long-short portfolio where analyst recommendations are inconsistent with anomaly predictions 
refers to the strategy that longs stocks in the long leg of the anomaly with the least favorable analyst recommendations 
and shorts stocks in the short-leg of the anomaly with the most favorable analyst recommendations. 
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average tend to be contradictory to the prescriptions of anomalies, although all of the differences 
in alphas between the “inconsistent” and “consistent” groups are positive, they are much smaller 
and insignificant, except in two cases: 0.54% (t-stat = 2.30) for Accrual and 0.51% (t-stat = 2.38) 
for IA.  
Another approach complementary to portfolio sorts is to run Fama–MacBeth regressions of 
stock returns in month t on anomaly characteristics interacted with analyst recommendations in 
month t - 1. The regression approach allows us to control for other firm characteristics associated 
with expected returns, including market capitalization ( 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) ), the book-to-market ratio 
(𝐿𝑛(𝐵/𝑀)), short-term reversal (stock return in month t - 1), idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿), past 
12-month turnover (𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟), analyst forecast dispersion (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛), and max daily return 
in the last month (𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛). To facilitate the interpretation of regression coefficients, we rank 
stocks into five groups based on anomalies and create three dummy variables, 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔, 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡, and 
𝑀𝑖𝑑 , which represent the long leg, short leg, and the remaining three middle portfolios, 
respectively. We also sort the stocks into three groups based on analyst recommendation levels, 
with the most favorable (unfavorable) recommendation coded as 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛) and the 
middle as 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑. The Fama–MacBeth regression is conducted as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 +
𝛽4𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 + 𝛽5𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽6𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1. 
(2) 
The regression results are reported in Table 5. Panel A reports the results for the MGMT 
anomalies and Panel B reports those for PERF anomalies. Overall, the results using the Fama–
MacBeth regression are similar to what we document for the double-sorted portfolios. The 
amplification effect of analyst recommendations on anomaly returns is most pronounced in the 
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short leg. By comparing the coefficients of two interaction terms, 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝  and 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛, we find that the short-leg stocks generate more negative future returns when 
those stocks are recommended favorably by analysts. For example, column (1) of Panel A shows 
that stocks in the short leg of the MGMT composite mispricing score generates a 0.40% (t-stat = 
2.16) lower return when they are associated with the most unfavorable recommendations, while 
the return is 0.69% (t-stat = 4.37) lower for the stocks associated with the most favorable 
recommendations. Similarly, column (1) of Panel B shows that stocks in the short leg of the PERF 
composite mispricing score generate a 0.44% (t-stat = 2.80) lower return when they are associated 
with the most unfavorable recommendations, while the return is 0.76% (t-stat = 3.19) lower for 
the stocks associated with the most favorable recommendations.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.4 Earnings announcement returns 
In this section, we further examine the earnings announcement returns of the double-sorted 
portfolios based on analyst recommendations and anomaly characteristics. The earnings 
announcement setting is especially useful for distinguishing between mispricing and risk-based 
explanations for our results, as short-run abnormal returns around earnings announcements are 
unlikely driven by exposures to omitted risk factors (La Porta et al., 1997).  
We conduct independent double sorts of all of the stocks at the end of each June based on 
the anomaly signal and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. We take the intersection 
of the long leg (top 20%) and short leg (bottom 20%) of each anomaly portfolio with the most and 
least favorable terciles of recommendation levels. We then calculate the mean DGTW-adjusted 
CAR[0,+1] around the next four quarters’ earnings announcements for each of the four portfolios.9 
                                                          
9Wee Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) for details about the construction of DGTW-adjusted CAR. 
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The consistent (inconsistent) group refers to the stocks where analyst recommendations are 
congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly predictions.  
Table 6 shows that our results also hold for earnings announcement returns. The abnormal 
returns to the long-short of the portfolio are larger when the analyst recommendations are 
contradictory to the anomaly predictions. For example, for the composite mispricing score PERF, 
the long-short portfolio generates a DGTW-adjusted CAR[0,+1] of 2.53% (t-stat = 17.85) when 
the analyst recommendations are contradictory to the anomaly predictions; by contrast, it is 2.15% 
(t-stat = 15.49) when the analyst recommendations are congruent with the anomaly predictions. 
The difference between the two is 0.38% with a t-stat of 2.04 and is most pronounced in the short 
leg of the portfolio. In other words, the stocks in the short leg of the anomaly with favorable analyst 
recommendations earn particularly negative returns around earnings announcements.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.5. Identifying skilled analysts based on the correlation between recommendations and 
anomalies 
 
The results so far suggest that, on average, analysts do not efficiently use the expected return 
information contained in anomalies when making recommendations, which proves to be inefficient 
ex post. This bias for analysts as a whole, however, may mask the great heterogeneity among 
individual analysts who differ significantly in their skills and incentives to generate informative 
recommendations. To shed further light on this issue, for each analyst, we calculate the correlation 
between her recommendation values and the two composite mispricing scores among all of the 
stocks covered by the analyst during the past three years. As anomaly signals contain expected 
return information, skilled or unbiased analysts’ recommendations should be more closely aligned 
with the anomaly signals on average. Using this correlation measure as a proxy for analyst skill, 
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we further study which analysts tend to issue recommendations that are more consistent with 
anomaly predictions. Specifically, we run the following panel regression:  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽6ln (𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1, 
(3) 
where 𝑠 ∈ {𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹} and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 stands for the correlation between analyst recommendation 
values and composite mispricing scores MGMT (or PERF). 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the analyst is ranked as an All-American analyst. 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠  is a 
dummy variable that equals one if analyst i’s absolute deviation in recommendation change from 
the consensus is larger than her prior deviation. 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 is the difference between the absolute 
forecast error of analyst i’s forecast and the average absolute forecast error across all analysts’ 
forecasts. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 is the number of years an analyst has covered the firm. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 is the 
number of years since the analyst first issued an earnings forecast for any firm. 𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) 
is the natural logarithm of the total number of analysts working at the brokerage firm employing 
the analyst. 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the total number of firms followed by the analyst. We also control for 
analyst and year fixed effects in some specifications.  
Table 7 presents the regression results. Across different specifications, forecast accuracy is 
positively related to our correlation measure and is particularly strong for 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 is 
also positively related to the analyst’s total working experience and the size of the brokerage firm, 
suggesting analysts with longer working experience and in larger brokerage firms are more likely 
to use performance-related anomaly information. However, for 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇, we find the opposite 
results. Large brokerage firm size and longer working experience are negatively related to 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇, suggesting analysts’ biased recommendations for MGMT-related anomalies may be 
due to strategic reasons. 
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.6. Market reactions to skilled analysts’ recommendations 
If anomaly signals are incrementally useful for identifying skilled or unbiased analysts, we 
expect the recommendations made by these analysts to elicit stronger market reactions. To test this, 
we run a panel regression of recommendation announcement returns on our correlation measure, 
controlling for recommendation, analyst, broker, and firm characteristics shown by the literature 
that affect the informativeness of analyst recommendations. Specifically, we run the following 
panel regression:  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽2|∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| + 𝛽3𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑒-𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡-𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 +
𝛽8𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1, 
(4) 
where 𝑌𝑖  is the two-day cumulative abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1] ) or the two-day absolute 
cumulative abnormal return ( |𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]| ) around analyst recommendations. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠  is the 
correlation of analyst recommendation with the composite mispricing measure, MGMT or PERF. 
|∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| is the absolute value of the recommendation change of an individual analyst. 
Other variables are as defined previously. 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡  stands for the vector of firm characteristics, 
including𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑉, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡y, 𝑀𝑂𝑀(−21,−1), and 𝑀𝑂𝑀(−252,−22). 
Table 8 reports the regression results. The coefficient on  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 is significantly positive 
for upward recommendation changes, and significantly negative for downward recommendation 
changes. The coefficient on 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇  is insignificant for both upward and downward 
recommendation changes. The results suggest that the market perceives analysts who are better at 
using performance-related anomaly signals as more skilled in general, and hence these analysts 
elicit stronger market reactions. The economic magnitude is substantial. For example, the 
coefficient on 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 reported in the last column of Panel A suggests that an analyst whose 
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stock recommendations are perfectly aligned with anomaly rankings (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 = 1) generates a 
two-day announcement return 0.4% higher than analysts whose recommendations are unrelated to 
anomaly signals (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹  = 0). The result is even stronger for downward recommendation 
changes; market reactions to downward recommendation changes of skilled analysts are 0.7% 
more negative than those of unskilled analysts.  
The incremental effect of our measure of skilled analysts survives after controlling for firm 
and analyst fixed effects in the panel regression. A significant coefficient on 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹  after 
controlling for analyst fixed effects means that an analyst’s recommendation becomes more 
informative when she becomes more skilled at using anomaly information for her 
recommendations. 
As a robustness check, we also conduct a regression by pooling upgrades and downgrades 
together and multiplying downgrade 𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]  by -1. Panel C presents the result, which 
confirms the informativeness of recommendations issued by skilled analysts whose 
recommendations are more aligned with anomaly signals.  
 
5. Additional Tests and Alternative Explanations 
5.1. Results in the post-publication period  
One alternative explanation for the contradiction between analyst recommendations and 
anomaly signals is that analysts are simply unaware of the information contained in anomalies 
before their discovery by academics. If this is true, analyst recommendations should become more 
aligned with anomaly predictions upon publication of these anomaly studies (McLean and Pontiff, 
2016). To examine this alternative, we redo the test by focusing on the post-publication period. 
Panel A of Table 9 shows the Fama–French alpha of the 11 anomalies in the post-publication 
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period. Consistent with McLean and Pontiff (2016), anomalies are generally weaker in the post-
publication period. The post-publication attenuation of anomaly returns is more pronounced for 
PERF-related anomalies than MGMT-related anomalies. Out of 11 anomalies, only 6 still generate 
significantly positive alphas (based on a one-sided test with t-stat > 1.65), whereas three (all from 
PERF) actually generate negative alphas, with GP earning a significantly negative alpha of -0.44% 
(t-stat = -1.78). Panel B reports the mean recommendation levels and changes for quintile 
portfolios sorted on each anomaly in the post-publication period. The result shows that for all 
MGMT-related anomalies, analysts still assign more favorable recommendations to stocks in the 
short leg than to stocks in the long leg of anomalies. Most MGMT-related anomalies still generate 
significant alphas in the post-publication period, suggesting that analysts’ unawareness of the 
return predictability of the anomalies does not fully explain our findings. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.2. Effect of firm size 
A typical explanation for why well-documented anomalies are not arbitraged away is limits 
to arbitrage. According to this explanation, competition between sophisticated investors would 
quickly eliminate any return predictability arising from anomalies without impediments to 
arbitrage. This explanation is difficult to reconcile with our evidence because analysts do not take 
positions and do not face trading frictions. Rather, our results suggest that analysts’ biased 
recommendations may be a source of frictions that impede the efficient correction of mispricing. 
Still, analysts may need to cater to institutional investors who indeed face non-trivial trading 
frictions. Our findings may be concentrated among small and illiquid stocks, where analysts do 
not have strong incentives to efficiently use the information in anomalies simply because their 
institutional clients cannot trade on such stocks at a low cost.  
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To examine this limits-to-arbitrage explanation, we redo our main tests for small and big 
firms separately. If the preceding explanation plays a role, we should find that analyst 
recommendations are more consistent with anomaly rankings among big stocks. We define small 
(big) stocks as those with market capitalization in the bottom (top) 30% using the NYSE size 
breakpoints as cutoffs.  
Panel A of Table 10 reports analyst recommendations across quintile portfolios sorted on 
anomalies for small and big firms separately. The general pattern is quite similar across small and 
big firms. For example, on average, analysts assign a 0.56 higher recommendation value to the 
short leg of MGMT than to the long leg among small stocks. For big stocks, this number is 0.55 
and still highly significant. In other words, analysts tend to issue more favorable recommendations 
to stocks classified as overvalued, even among big firms where trading frictions are less severe.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Panel B of Table 10 shows that the degree to which biased analyst recommendations amplify 
anomaly returns does not differ significantly across small and big stocks. Take the composite 
mispricing measure PERF as an example. The difference in the monthly alphas between consistent 
and inconsistent L/S portfolios is 0.74% (t-stat = 2.95) for small stocks and 0.60% (t-stat = 2.68) 
for big stocks. Overall, our results do not support the alternative explanation that analysts are 
reluctant to use anomaly signals when making recommendations simply because of limits-to-
arbitrage concerns.  
As firm size may be a noisy proxy for trading frictions, we redo the subsample tests based 
on trading cost measures, where the trading cost is measured as the daily percentage quoted spread 
following Chung and Zhang (2014). The results are quite similar, as reported in Table A1 in the 
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Online Appendix. Overall, even among stocks facing low trading costs, analyst recommendations 
are still largely inconsistent with anomaly predictions and in fact amplify anomaly returns.  
 
5.3. Effect of institutional holdings 
Studies have documented that institutional investors as a group tend to trade in opposition to 
the prescriptions of stock return anomalies. For example, institutions tend to buy growth stocks 
and sell value stocks (Frazzini and Lamont, 2008; Jiang, 2010). Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) 
examine the relation between several well-known stock anomalies and changes in institutional 
investors’ holdings. They find that institutions tend to buy overvalued stocks and sell undervalued 
stocks. Therefore, analysts may issue biased recommendations mainly to cater to institutional 
investors’ preferences for overvalued stocks. To examine this possibility, we run our baseline tests 
on sub-samples divided by stocks’ institutional ownership. Analysts’ recommendations should be 
more biased for stocks held by more institutions according to this alternative explanation.  
Panel A of Table 11 reports analyst consensus recommendations across quintiles of anomaly-
sorted portfolios for stocks with low and high institutional ownership, separately. We define 
institutional ownership as the number of shares held by 13F institutional investors over the total 
number of shares outstanding. The results show that analyst recommendations are similarly biased 
for both groups of stocks. Looking at high-institutional-ownership stocks, analyst 
recommendations for the short leg of MGMT is 0.56 higher than those for the long leg of MGMT. 
The difference in recommendations between two extreme quintiles is 0.54 among stocks with low 
institutional ownership.  
[Insert Table 11 here.] 
29 
Panel B of Table 11 further shows that analysts’ biased recommendations amplify anomaly 
returns to a similar degree for stocks with low and high institutional ownership. Take the PERF 
composite mispricing measure as an example. The difference in L/S portfolio alphas between 
consistent and inconsistent groups is 0.63% (t-stat = 2.14) for stocks with low institutional 
ownership and 0.55% (t-stat = 2.45) for stocks with high institutional ownership. Overall, the 
evidence is inconsistent with the alternative explanation that analysts issue biased 
recommendations mainly to cater to institutional investors’ preferences. 
In Table A2 in the Online Appendix, we conduct a similar subsample test based on the 
stock’s ownership by long-horizon institutional investors, who are defined as those “dedicated” 
13F institutions following the classification of Bushee (1998).10 As most of our anomalies are 
based on annual accounting information and characterized by low portfolio turnover, long-horizon 
institutions may have a stronger distortionary effect on analysts’ behavior. However, the results 
show that analyst recommendations are similarly biased for both groups of stocks, regardless of 
whether they are held largely by long-horizon institutions.  
 
5.4. Effect of investor sentiment 
Stambaugh et al. (2012) find that anomalies are more pronounced following high sentiment 
periods, suggesting that investors’ over-optimism during high-sentiment periods drives anomaly 
returns. Hribar and McInnis (2012) find that analyst forecasts are more optimistic for hard-to-value 
stocks during high-sentiment periods. This suggests that analyst recommendations could be more 
biased and that the amplification effect of analysts’ biased recommendations on anomaly returns 
                                                          
10 According to Bushee (2001), dedicated institutions are characterized by large average investments in portfolio firms 
and extremely low turnover, consistent with a “relationship investing” role and a commitment to provide long-term 
patient capital.  
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should be more pronounced during high- rather than low-sentiment periods. To test this conjecture, 
we use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) Sentiment Index as a proxy for the aggregate investor 
sentiment in the stock market and define a month as a high-sentiment period if the Baker-Wurgler 
Sentiment Index over the previous month is above the median of the whole sample and a low-
sentiment period otherwise. We then evaluate how analysts differentially use anomaly information 
over high- and low-sentiment periods.  
Panel A of Table 12 reports the mean analyst recommendation values across the quintiles of 
anomaly-sorted portfolios in low- and high-sentiment periods separately. Consistent with the 
biased analyst hypothesis, analyst recommendations are more contradictory to anomaly 
predictions during high-sentiment periods. Following low-sentiment periods, the difference in 
recommendation values between the long- and short legs of MGMT is -0.29. Following high-
sentiment periods, the difference in recommendation values between the long- and short legs of 
MGMT increases to -0.60. Given the evidence that anomalies have stronger return predictability 
in high-sentiment periods (Stambaugh et al., 2012), analysts should follow anomalies more closely 
in such times if they are sophisticated and unbiased. However, we find exactly the opposite results, 
suggesting that over-optimism shared with other investors during high-sentiment periods causes 
analyst recommendations to be more contradictory to anomaly signals.  
Panel B of Table 12 shows not only that analyst recommendations are more biased during 
the high-sentiment periods, but also that their biased recommendations amplify anomaly returns 
more strongly in such times. Take the PERF composite mispricing measure as an example. The 
difference in the L/S portfolio alphas between consistent and inconsistent groups is an insignificant 
0.12% during low-sentiment periods, while it is 0.99% (t-stat = 3.30) during high-sentiment 
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periods. Overall, the subsample results based on the Sentiment Index suggests that behavioral bias 
on the part of analysts is partially responsible for analysts’ inefficient use of anomaly information.  
 
5.5. Other anomalies 
So far, we have focused on the 11 prominent anomalies proposed by Stambaugh et al. (2012) 
to avoid cherry-picking the anomalies. In this section, we examine whether our main results hold 
for six other prominent anomalies, including idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) (Ang, Xing, and 
Zhang, 2006), maximum daily returns in the last month (MaxReturn) (Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw, 
2011), past 12-month turnover (Turnover) (Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman, 2001), cash 
flow duration (Duration) (Weber, 2018), long-run reversal (LMW) (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985), 
and market beta (Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler, 2011; Frazzini and Pedersen 2014). These 
anomalies are also documented to be associated with significant abnormal returns by various 
studies. 
Table A3 in the Online Appendix reports the long-short portfolio returns of these six new 
anomalies. Panel A reports the raw returns and Panel B reports the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor adjusted alphas. Overall, all of the long-short portfolios based on these six anomalies 
generate significant Fama and French (1993) three-factor alphas, with monthly alphas ranging 
from 0.4% to 1%.  
We then examine whether analysts take advantage of this anomaly information when 
recommending stocks. Table A4 reports the level and change of the consensus recommendations 
for quintile portfolios sorted on each of the six anomalies. Similar to our baseline results, our 
findings are pervasive across all six anomalies. Stocks in the short leg of anomalies tend to receive 
more favorable recommendations than do stocks in the long leg. Table A5 shows the results from 
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independent double sorts based on the six anomaly signals and the level of analyst 
recommendations. Consistent with our previous analysis, when analyst recommendations are 
inconsistent with anomaly predictions, anomaly returns are significantly amplified. The 
inconsistent long-short portfolio generates a much larger alpha than the consistent portfolio for all 
six anomalies, and the differences in alphas are significant in five out of six anomalies. The 
consistent results obtained from these market-based anomalies further support our conclusion that 
analysts do not efficiently use anomaly information when making recommendations.  
 
5.6. Informativeness of analyst consensus recommendations 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) examine the informativeness of consensus analyst recommendations 
using the recommendation data from Zacks Investment Research from 1985 to 1998. Similarly, 
Barber et al. (2001) look at the investment value of consensus recommendation using Zacks data 
from 1985 to 1996. Their results show that stocks with favorable (upgraded) analyst 
recommendations outperform stocks with unfavorable (downgraded) recommendations, 
suggesting that analyst recommendations have investment value to investors. To reconcile their 
evidence with our finding that analyst consensus recommendations are inefficient on average, we 
re-examine the unconditional return predictability of analyst consensus recommendations using 
I/B/E/S data over the sample period from 1993 to 2014.  
Specifically, at the beginning of each quarter, we sort stocks into quintiles based on 
consensus recommendations (both the level and change of recommendations) observed at the end 
of the last quarter, and re-balance the portfolio quarterly. Panel A of Table A6 reports the Fama-
French three-factor alphas on the long-short portfolios, where we long stocks with the most 
favorable (upgraded) recommendations and short stocks with the most unfavorable (downgraded) 
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recommendations. We also use monthly recommendation values and rebalance the portfolios 
monthly, with corresponding results reported in Panel B of Table A6. 
Our results show that the level of recommendation is uninformative for future returns over 
various sample periods, while the change of recommendations is more informative. However, the 
economic magnitude of the return predictability of the change of recommendations is relatively 
small, generating an alpha of 30 bps per month over the full sample. In addition, analyst 
recommendations seem to be more informative in the early periods. The change of consensus 
recommendations generates an alpha of 69 bps over the 1993-2000 period, while the alpha 
becomes insignificant in the 2000-2014 period.11 Overall, we believe the different results between 
our paper and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) are probably due to the different sample periods studied in 
these two papers.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the value and efficiency of analyst recommendations through the 
lens of capital market anomalies. Contrary to the common view that analysts are sophisticated 
information intermediaries who help improve market efficiency, we show that analysts do not fully 
use the information in anomaly signals when making recommendations. In particular, analysts tend 
to give more favorable recommendations to stocks classified as overvalued (the short leg of an 
anomaly), and these stocks tend to have particularly negative abnormal returns in the future. 
Overall, our results suggest that analysts’ biased recommendations could be a source of market 
frictions that impede the efficient correction of mispricing. 
                                                          
11 Our subsample results are consistent with Altınkılıç, Hansen, and Ye (2016) in that analysts’ recommendation 
revisions no longer predict future long-term returns in the recent information era.  
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We make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the 
origin and persistence of stock return anomalies by showing that analysts’ biased 
recommendations can be a significant force contributing to mispricing in the financial market. 
Second, we contribute to our understanding of analysts’ role as informational intermediaries by 
revealing that analysts do not use the valuable information in anomaly signals when making 
recommendations and often contradict anomaly prescriptions. Lastly, we develop a simple method 
to identify skilled unbiased analysts based on the correlation between their recommendation values 
and anomaly signals, and show its usefulness beyond existing analyst skills or experience measures.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in this study. Rec (Δ𝑅𝑒𝑐) stands for the level (change) 
of analyst consensus recommendations, where 5 is strong buy and 1 is strong sell. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟MGMT  (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟PERF ) is the 
correlation between analyst recommendation ranking and two composite mispricing rankings, constructed following 
Stambaugh and Yuan (2017). |∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙|  is the absolute value of the change of individual analyst’s 
recommendation. 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 is a dummy variable that equals one if the analyst is ranked as an All-American (first, 
second, third, or runner-up teams) in the Institutional Investor magazine in the year prior to the recommendation 
change and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐 is a dummy variable that equals one if the analyst issues a forecast 
revision and also issues a recommendation change for the same stock in the three trading days surrounding the forecast 
revision date and the recommendation change is in the same direction as the forecast revision. 𝑃𝑟𝑒‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) is a dummy variable that equals one if the recommendation change is issued within two weeks prior 
to (after) an earnings announcement. 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 is a dummy variable that equals one if the absolute 
deviation of the recommendation change from the consensus is larger than the absolute deviation of the prior 
recommendation from the consensus. If a firm has fewer than 3 outstanding recommendations, this value is set to zero. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 is the difference between the absolute forecast error of analyst i on firm j’s earnings and the average 
absolute forecast error across all analysts on firm j, scaled by the average absolute forecast error across all analysts’ 
forecasts on firm j’s earnings. This figure is multiplied by (-1) and averaged across all stocks covered the analyst in a 
given year. A higher value of this variable indicates higher precision of the analyst’s forecasts. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 is the number 
of years an analyst has covered the firm since the analyst’s first forecast on this firm appears in I/B/E/S. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 is 
the number of years since the analyst first issued an earnings forecast for any firm. 𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is the natural 
logarithm of the total number of analysts working at the brokerage firm. 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the total number of firms 
followed by an analyst in a given year. 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘BV is the ranking of a firm’s book value, with 10 (1) as the largest 
(smallest), 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) is the natural logarithm of firm market capitalization, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the standard deviation of 
daily returns over the 63 days prior to the recommendation change, 𝑀𝑂𝑀(−21,−1) is the stock return over the 21 trading 
days prior to the recommendation. 𝑀𝑂𝑀(−252,−22)  is the stock return over the 252 trading days prior to the 
recommendation, excluding the 21 trading days prior to the recommendation. The sample period is from January 1993 
to December 2014. 
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Variable N Mean Std dev Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
𝑅𝑒𝑐 380,115 3.76 0.74 1 3 4 4 5 
Δ𝑅𝑒c 314,361 -0.08 0.76 -4 -0.5 0 0.17 4 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟MGMT 562,391 -0.04 0.26 -1 -0.19 -0.03 0.11 1 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟PERF 547,000 0.04 0.26 -1 -0.11 0.04 0.19 1 
|∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| 383,782 1.06 0.74 0 1 1 2 4 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 574,954 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐 574,954 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
Pre-earnings 574,954 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 0 1 
Post-earnings 574,954 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 574,954 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 540,404 0.26 0.63 -75.91 0.14 0.31 0.45 1 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥p 558,358 2.61 3.66 0 0.09 1.22 3.55 31.99 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 572,400 10.51 7.42 0 4.08 9.82 15.58 32.91 
Ln(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) 574,954 5.95 1.15 0 5.21 6.14 6.82 8.14 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘BV 574,954 5.5 2.87 1 3 5.5 8 10 
Ln(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) 463,736 14.35 1.80 5.25 13.09 14.28 15.56 20.14 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(−21,−1) 455,419 -0.43 17.66 -375.79 -7.19 0.93 8.11 205.59 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(−252,−22) 429,339 0.02 0.21 -2.27 -0.07 0.04 0.13 1.67 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 446,408 0.03 0.02 0 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.7 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 574,954 9.57 6.54 1 5 8 13 46 
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Table 2: Informativeness of anomaly signals 
 
This table reports average returns and alphas on the long-short portfolios of 11 anomalies and two composite 
mispricing factors. We group 11 anomalies into 2 clusters. MGMT (PERF) stands for the composite mispricing factor 
of the first (second) cluster. Panel A (Panel B) reports the raw returns of Cluster 1 (Cluster 2) anomalies and Panel C 
(Panel D) the Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas of Cluster 1 (Cluster 2) anomalies. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The sample period is 1993-2014. 
 
Panel A: Cluster 1 (Raw returns) 
 MGMT NSI CEI Accrual NOA AG IA 
Long 1.25% 1.23% 1.21% 1.14% 1.19% 1.26% 1.18% 
 (4.16) (4.31) (4.71) (3.01) (3.49) (3.46) (3.33) 
Short 0.53% 0.67% 0.76% 0.78% 0.57% 0.50% 0.59% 
 (1.24) (1.62) (1.83) (1.78) (1.50) (1.15) (1.41) 
Long – Short  0.72% 0.57% 0.44% 0.35% 0.62% 0.76% 0.60% 
 (3.12) (2.63) (1.73) (2.08) (3.65) (3.89) (3.60) 
Panel B: Cluster 2 (Raw returns) 
 PERF Distress O-score MOM GP ROA  
Long 1.33% 1.29% 1.15% 1.28% 1.33% 1.33%  
 (3.96) (4.45) (3.15) (3.27) (3.75) (3.81)  
Short 0.58% 0.81% 0.88% 0.62% 0.83% 0.51%  
 (1.41) (2.23) (1.97) (1.40) (2.58) (1.01)  
Long – Short  0.75% 0.48% 0.27% 0.66% 0.50% 0.82%  
 (3.68) (2.63) (1.51) (2.10) (2.93) (3.23)  
Panel C: Cluster 1 (Alphas) 
 MGMT NSI CEI Accrual NOA TAG IA 
Long 0.23% 0.26% 0.32% 0.00% 0.17% 0.13% 0.07% 
 (3.61) (3.22) (3.82) (-0.01) (1.84) (1.84) (0.86) 
Short -0.62% -0.48% -0.37% -0.35% -0.55% -0.63% -0.57% 
 (-4.83) (-4.88) (-3.02) (-2.93) (-4.43) (-4.84) (-4.19) 
Long – Short  0.86% 0.75% 0.68% 0.35% 0.72% 0.76% 0.64% 
 (5.75) (6.53) (5.09) (2.75) (4.28) (5.11) (4.38) 
Panel D: Cluster 2 (Alphas) 
 PERF Distress O-score MOM GP ROA  
Long 0.36% 0.37% 0.13% 0.24% 0.29% 0.32%  
 (3.85) (3.65) (1.33) (1.87) (3.04) (3.22)  
Short -0.63% -0.33% -0.31% -0.62% -0.18% -0.77%  
 (-4.72) (-2.56) (-2.91) (-3.02) (-1.50) (-5.37)  
Long – Short  0.99% 0.69% 0.45% 0.86% 0.47% 1.09%  
 (5.34) (4.03) (3.15) (2.85) (2.95) (5.64)  
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Table 3: Analyst consensus recommendations for anomaly stocks 
 
This table reports the average level and change of consensus recommendations for quintile portfolios sorted by the 
anomaly variables. We classify anomalies into 2 clusters. MGMT (PERF) stands for the composite mispricing factor 
of the first (second) cluster. Column “Rec” reports the average level of consensus recommendations and Column 
“ΔRec” reports the average change of consensus recommendations. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results of Cluster 1 
(Cluster 2) anomalies. ***, **, and * indicate the p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10% or less, respectively. The sample period 
is 1993-2014. 
 
Panel A: Cluster 1 
 MGMT  NSI  CEI  Accrual 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.53 -0.06  3.63 -0.08  3.55 -0.06  3.70 -0.06 
2  3.64 -0.05  3.65 -0.05  3.62 -0.05  3.67 -0.05 
3  3.78 -0.02  3.75 -0.03  3.79 -0.08  3.79 -0.01 
4  3.92 -0.02  3.88 0.00  3.91 -0.03  3.91 0.00 
Short 4.09 0.02  4.02 0.02  4.02 0.04  4.06 0.01 
Long - Short -0.56*** -0.08***  -0.39*** -0.10***  -0.48*** -0.10***  -0.36*** -0.06*** 
 NOA  AG  IA    
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec    
Long 3.72 -0.04  3.62 -0.06  3.69 -0.01    
2  3.72 -0.03  3.62 -0.04  3.76 -0.03    
3  3.72 -0.02  3.76 -0.04  3.79 -0.03    
4  3.79 -0.03  3.90 -0.02  3.88 -0.03    
Short 4.02 -0.03  4.07 0.00  4.02 -0.02    
Long – Short  -0.30*** -0.01  -0.46*** -0.06***  -0.33*** 0.01    
Panel B: Cluster 2 
 PERF  Distress  O-score  MOM 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.91 0.04  3.84 0.01  3.89 -0.02  3.91 0.07 
2  3.85 0.01  3.84 0.01  3.81 0.01  3.78 0.01 
3  3.78 -0.03  3.82 -0.01  3.78 -0.01  3.74 -0.01 
4  3.70 -0.07  3.73 -0.03  3.76 -0.03  3.73 -0.06 
Short 3.72 -0.11  3.65 -0.09  3.86 -0.05  3.79 -0.15 
Long – Short  0.19*** 0.15***  0.19*** 0.10***  0.03*** 0.03***  0.13*** 0.22*** 
 GP  ROA       
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec       
Long 3.85 -0.01  3.94 0.03       
2  3.85 -0.03  3.85 0.01       
3  3.85 -0.03  3.76 -0.03       
4  3.74 -0.03  3.64 -0.07       
Short 3.69 -0.06  3.82 -0.10       
Long – Short  0.16*** 0.05***  0.12*** 0.13***       
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Table 4: Abnormal returns of anomaly portfolios conditional on analyst recommendations 
 
This table reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of portfolios sorted independently by anomaly 
characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At the end of each June, we sort stocks into three 
groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and independently into quintiles based on anomaly 
characteristic. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top (bottom) tercile based on analyst consensus recommendations. 
Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued (overvalued) quintile based on anomaly characteristics. 
Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio where analyst recommendations are in congruent with 
(contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the difference in abnormal returns between Inconsistent and 
Consistent portfolios. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results of Cluster 1 (Cluster 2) anomalies. The t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. The sample period is 1993-2014. 
 
Panel A: Cluster 1 
 MGMT  NSI  CEI  Accrual 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.40% 0.17%  0.37% 0.23%  0.44% 0.27%  0.10% 0.07% 
 (4.04) (2.24)  (3.73) (2.61)  (4.13) (2.92)  (0.89) (0.71) 
Short -0.83% -0.44%  -0.63% -0.45%  -0.51% -0.21%  -0.64% -0.07% 
 (-5.47) (-2.99)  (-5.05) (-3.79)  (-3.66) (-1.70)  (-4.37) (-0.49) 
Consistent 0.85%  0.81%  0.65%  0.18% 
 (4.67)  (5.31)  (4.25)  (1.02) 
Inconsistent 1.00%  0.87%  0.77%  0.72% 
 (5.58)  (5.80)  (4.87)  (4.10) 
Diff: Incon – Con 0.16%  0.05%  0.12%  0.54% 
 (0.78)  (0.28)  (0.70)  (2.30) 
  NOA  AG  IA    
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down    
Long 0.08% 0.18%  0.22% 0.06%  0.11% 0.14%    
 (0.55) (1.79)  (2.12 (0.74)  (1.08) (1.55)    
Short -0.69% -0.48%  -0.84% -0.44%  -0.85% -0.38%    
 (-4.65) (-3.87)  (-5.33) (-3.08)  (-5.34) (-2.65)    
Consistent 0.56%  0.66%  0.48%    
 (2.84)  (3.90)  (2.86)    
Inconsistent 0.87%  0.90%  0.99%    
 (4.40)  (4.86)  (5.42)    
Diff: Incon – Con 0.31%  0.24%  0.51%    
 (1.51)  (1.18)  (2.38)    
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Table 4 (continued): Abnormal returns of anomaly portfolios conditional on analyst recommendations 
 
Panel B: Cluster 2 
 PERF  Distress  O-score  MOM 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.40% 0.47%  0.36% 0.36%  0.08% 0.22%  0.40% 0.41% 
 (3.51) (4.67)  (2.81) (3.21)  (0.64) (1.96)  (2.62) (2.88) 
Short -1.09% -0.50%  -0.71% -0.27%  -0.55% -0.18%  -1.09% -0.45% 
 (-5.98) (-4.11)  -4.24 -1.85  (-3.81 -1.43)  (-4.65) (-2.04) 
Consistent 0.90%  0.63%  0.26%  0.85% 
 (4.82)  (3.08)  (1.42)  (2.54) 
Inconsistent 1.57%  1.07%  0.76%  1.50% 
 (6.54)  (5.03)  (4.24)  (4.43) 
Diff: Incon – Con 0.67%  0.44%  0.50%  0.65% 
 (3.17)  (2.27)  (2.24)  (3.40) 
 GP  ROA       
 Up Down  Up Down       
Long 0.22% 0.37%  0.28% 0.49%       
 (1.82) (3.41)  (2.19) (4.95)       
Short -0.39% -0.11%  -1.07% -0.63%       
 (-2.51) (-0.88)  (-6.20 (-4.33)       
Consistent 0.33%  0.91%       
 (1.98)  (4.21)       
Inconsistent 0.76%  1.56%       
 (3.64)  (7.23)       
Diff: Incon – Con 0.43%  0.65%       
 (2.17)  (2.98)       
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Table 5: Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 
This table reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of stock returns on the anomaly characteristics interacted 
with analyst consensus recommendations. Long (short) is a dummy variable that equals one for stocks in the top 
(bottom) quintile based on the anomaly signal. RecUp (RecDown) is a dummy that equals one for stocks in the top 
(bottom) tercile based on the consensus recommendation. We run the Fama-MacBeth regression as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝
+ 𝛽5𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽6𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1, 
where 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡  stands for a set of firm controls, including firm size, short-term reversal, book-to-market ratio, 
idiosyncratic volatility, past 12-month turnover, analyst forecast dispersion, and last month maximum return. Panel A 
(Panel B) reports the results of Cluster 1 (Cluster 2) anomalies. The significance of the estimates is based on Newey-
West (1987) adjusted t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The sample period is from January 1993 to December 2014. 
 
Dependent Variable: Excess Return (%) 
Panel A: Cluster 1 
 MGMT NSI CEI Accrual NOA AG IA 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 0.272** 0.083 0.124 0.421*** -0.144 0.241* 0.128 
 (2.16) (0.70) (0.92) (2.92) (-0.81) (1.66) (1.04) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 0.340* 0.007 0.176 0.279 0.109 0.438* 0.161 
 (1.68) (0.06) (1.27) (1.26) (0.64) (1.95) (0.67) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 0.295** 0.016 -0.033 0.558* 0.040 0.354** 0.583*** 
 (2.49) (0.11) (-0.20) (1.90) (0.23) (2.12) (2.87) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 -0.688*** -0.536*** -0.470*** -0.304* -0.550*** -0.760*** -0.477** 
 (-4.37) (-4.89) (-3.60) (-1.87) (-3.43) (-3.93) (-2.36) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 0.166 0.125 0.036 0.223 -0.224 -0.161 0.275 
 (0.69) (0.51) (0.23) (0.78) (-1.60) (-1.03) (1.01) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 -0.403** -0.571*** -0.195 -0.045 -0.409** -0.522** -0.389* 
 (-2.16) (-3.31) (-0.91) (-0.20) (-2.54) (-2.29) (-1.93) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡‐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 -1.484** -1.538** -1.464** -1.514** -1.511** -1.567** -1.639*** 
 (-2.33) (-2.48) (-2.34) (-2.43) (-2.42) (-2.50) (-2.68) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) -0.070 -0.077 -0.073 -0.063 -0.073 -0.069 -0.055 
 (-1.32) (-1.54) (-1.49) (-1.18) (-1.38) (-1.33) (-1.06) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐵/𝑀) -0.050 -0.053 -0.046 -0.036 -0.041 -0.055 -0.040 
 (-0.39) (-0.41) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.33) (-0.43) (-0.30) 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 -9.001 -12.878 -11.743 -12.212 -10.896 -10.719 -9.256 
 (-0.94) (-1.45) (-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.15) (-1.17) (-0.99) 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 0.490 0.339 0.404 0.154 0.374 0.370 0.093 
 (0.45) (0.31) (0.37) (0.14) (0.34) (0.35) (0.09) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 0.000 0.062 0.111 -0.149 0.243 0.214 0.044 
 (0.00) (0.15) (0.25) (-0.39) (0.60) (0.57) (0.11) 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 -0.764 0.069 -0.641 -1.000 -0.332 -0.092 -1.102 
 (-0.29) (0.03) (-0.24) (-0.36) (-0.12) (-0.04) (-0.43) 
N 520,034 520,034 520,034 520,034 520,034 520,034 520,034 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 
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Table 5 (continued): Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: Excess returns (%) 
Panel B: Cluster 2 
 PERF Distress O-score MOM GP ROA 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 0.281** 0.203 0.186 0.275 0.213 0.352** 
 (2.42) (1.20) (1.46) (1.37) (1.50) (2.54) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 0.398*** 0.102 0.232 0.664*** 0.606** 0.489*** 
 (3.13) (0.77) (1.36) (3.24) (2.18) (3.62) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 0.323* 0.189 0.191 0.510** 0.511*** 0.354** 
 (1.96) (1.36) (1.40) (2.01) (3.65) (2.24) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑈𝑝 -0.756*** -0.779** -0.073 -0.591*** -0.400* -0.921*** 
 (-3.19) (-2.58) (-0.36) (-2.67) (-1.83) (-3.17) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑑 0.053 0.238 0.108 0.002 -0.080 -0.087 
 (0.23) (1.02) (0.41) (0.01) (-0.42) (-0.22) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 -0.437*** -0.339** 0.211 -0.169 -0.346 -0.088 
 (-2.80) (-2.15) (1.26) (-0.86) (-1.43) (-0.33) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡‐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 -1.625*** -1.506** -1.511** -1.359** -1.547** -1.701*** 
 (-2.61) (-2.43) (-2.41) (-2.15) (-2.52) (-2.68) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) -0.069 -0.066 -0.066 -0.060 -0.063 -0.080 
 (-1.36) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-1.12) (-1.18) (-1.64) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐵/𝑀) 0.035 -0.010 -0.018 0.048 0.021 0.007 
 (0.27) (-0.08) (-0.14) (0.42) (0.16) (0.05) 
𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 -12.760 -14.032 -14.855 -13.182 -13.927 -11.836 
 (-1.38) (-1.54) (-1.58) (-1.50) (-1.54) (-1.21) 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 -0.053 0.004 0.075 -0.048 -0.121 0.140 
 (-0.05) (0.00) (0.07) (-0.05) (-0.11) (0.13) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 0.277 0.414 0.168 0.302 0.314 0.385 
 (0.70) (0.97) (0.40) (0.78) (0.81) (0.96) 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 0.363 0.010 0.162 -0.172 -0.198 0.369 
 (0.14) (0.00) (0.06) (-0.07) (-0.08) (0.14) 
N 520,034 520,034 520,034 520,034 520,034 520,034 
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.070 0.073 0.078 0.077 0.078 
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Table 6: Earnings announcement returns 
 
This table reports the two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR [0, +1]) around quarterly earnings announcements 
of portfolios sorted independently by anomaly characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At 
the end of each June, we sort stocks into three groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and 
independently into quintiles based on anomaly characteristics. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top (bottom) tercile 
based on analyst consensus recommendations. Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued (overvalued) 
quintile based on anomaly characteristics. Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio where analyst 
recommendations are in congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the difference in CAR [0, 
+1] between the Inconsistent and Consistent portfolios. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results of Cluster 1 (Cluster 2) 
anomalies. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The sample period is 1993-2014.  
 
Panel A: Cluster 1 
 MGMT  NSI  CEI  Accrual 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.11% 0.10%  0.18% 0.15%  0.29% 0.19%  -0.16% 0.12% 
 (1.06) (1.05)  (1.64) (2.03)  (3.40) (2.73)  (-1.33) (1.17) 
Short 0.12% 0.00%  -0.09% 0.00%  0.17% 0.20%  0.14% 0.22% 
 (1.30) (0.03)  (-0.98) (-0.03)  (2.13) (1.69)  (1.37) (1.50) 
Consistent 0.11%  0.19%  0.09%  -0.38% 
 (0.48)  (0.87)  (0.57)  (-1.88) 
Inconsistent -0.03%  0.24%  0.02%  -0.02% 
 -(0.19)  (1.65)  (0.12)  (-0.12) 
Diff: Incon – Con -0.14%  0.06%  -0.08%  0.36% 
 (-0.61)  (0.26)  (-0.43)  (1.78) 
 NOA  AG  IA    
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down    
Long -0.10% 0.09%  -0.24% 0.10%  -0.07% 0.22%    
 (-1.13) (0.95)  (-2.65 1.11  (-0.61) 2.24    
Short 0.12% -0.06%  0.04% -0.05%  -0.03% -0.07%    
 (0.98) (-0.62)  (0.37) -0.29  (-0.27) -0.73    
Consistent -0.04%  -0.20%  0.00%    
 (-0.26)  (-1.13)  (-0.03)    
Inconsistent -0.03%  0.06%  0.25%    
 (-0.15)  (0.38)  (1.70)    
Diff: Incon – Con 0.01%  0.25%  0.25%    
 (0.09)  (1.49)  (1.21)    
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Table 6 (continued): Earnings announcement returns 
 
Panel B: Cluster 2 
 PERF  Distress  O-score  MOM 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 1.38% 1.45% 
 
0.89% 0.90% 
 
0.26% 0.20% 
 
1.78% 1.84% 
 (13.30) (10.93) 
 
(10.45) (10.88) 
 
(2.28) (1.96) 
 
(13.08) (16.29) 
Short -1.08% -0.77% 
 
-0.61% -0.19% 
 
-0.39% 0.07% 
 
-1.73% -1.45% 
 (-16.19) (-8.12) 
 
(-7.14) (-3.01) 
 
(-4.46) (0.57) 
 
(-23.14) (-11.10) 
Consistent 2.15% 
 
1.08% 
 
0.19% 
 
3.23% 
 (15.49) 
 
(9.39) 
 
(1.08) 
 
(15.46) 
Inconsistent 2.53% 
 
1.52% 
 
0.59% 
 
3.57% 
 (17.85) 
 
(11.50) 
 
(4.06) 
 
(23.15) 
Diff: Incon – Con 0.38% 
 
0.44% 
 
0.40% 
 
0.34% 
 (2.04) 
 
(3.15) 
 
(1.83) 
 
(1.89) 
 GP  ROA       
 Up Down  Up Down       
Long 0.38% 0.50% 
 
0.94% 0.98% 
      
 (6.27) (4.66) 
 
(8.86) (7.91) 
      
Short -0.27% -0.03% 
 
-1.04% -0.86% 
      
 (-3.96) (-0.40) 
 
(-12.57) (-8.18) 
      
Consistent 0.42% 
 
1.79% 
      
 (3.83) 
 
(10.91) 
      
Inconsistent 0.77% 
 
2.03% 
      
 (5.74) 
 
(11.27) 
      
Diff: Incon – Con 0.35% 
 
0.23% 
      
 (1.82) 
 
(0.81) 
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Table 7: Determinants of analyst skills 
 
This table presents panel regression results of analyst skills on analyst and firm characteristics, where skill is measured 
as the correlation between individual analyst’ recommendations and two mispricing scores among stocks covered by 
the analyst. We conduct the panel regression as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 
+𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽7𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1, 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠  stands for the correlation between individual analyst’ recommendations and two mispricing scores, 
MGMT or PERF, among all stocks covered by the analyst. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors 
are clustered by analyst, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  The sample period is from 1993 to 2014. 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇  
 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹  
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 -0.004 -0.014** -0.003 -0.011*  0.007 0.012** 0.006 0.012* 
 (-0.74) (-2.21) (-0.56) (-1.75)  (1.43) (2.00) (1.21) (1.85) 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.25) (-0.03) (-0.41) (-0.30)  (-0.39) (-1.14) (-0.17) (-1.00) 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 0.004** 0.002 0.005** 0.002  0.006*** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.005** 
 (2.10) (0.63) (2.21) (0.75)  (3.01) (2.42) (2.78) (2.14) 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥p -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001  -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* 
 (-1.06) (-1.49) (-0.97) (-1.47)  (-1.95) (-2.17) (-1.66) (-1.68) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.001**  0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (-1.78) (-0.55) (-2.20) (-1.99)  (2.73) (-0.02) (3.65) (2.55) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007***  0.004*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.002 
 (-5.45) (-3.81) (-5.26) (-3.69)  (3.13) (1.18) (2.74) (1.21) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000**  0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.75) (-2.30) (-0.63) (-2.37)  (1.56) (1.66) (0.94) (1.45) 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000  0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.45) (1.74) (2.13) (1.29)  (0.16) (-0.46) (0.77) (0.05) 
Intercept 0.018** 0.013 0.017* -0.021  0.003 0.022* 0.004 0.049*** 
 (2.05) (1.17) (1.88) (-1.43)  (0.33) (1.93) (0.41) (3.45) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Analyst FE No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
N 34,866 34,866 34,866 34,866  33,705 33,705 33,705 33,705 
Adjusted R2 0.0020 0.0016 0.0018 0.0042  0.0010 0.0005 0.0009 0.0055 
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Table 8: Market reactions to skilled analysts’ recommendation announcements 
 
This table presents the panel regression of analyst recommendation announcement returns on our measure of analyst 
skill, where skill is measured as the correlation between individual analyst’ recommendations and two mispricing 
scores among stocks covered by the analyst. We estimate the panel regression as follows: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽2|∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| + 𝛽3𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐 
+𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑒‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡‐𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 
+𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+1, 
where 𝑌𝑖  is the 2-day cumulative abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]) or the 2-day absolute cumulative abnormal 
return ( |𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]|) around recommendation announcements. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑠  is the correlation between individual 
analyst’ recommendations and two composite mispricing scores, MGMT or PERF, among stocks covered by the 
analyst. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡  stands for the vector of firm characteristics, including 
𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) , 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐵𝑉 , volatility, 𝑀𝑂𝑀(−21,−1) , and 𝑀𝑂𝑀(−252,−22).  Panel A reports the results for upgrade 
recommendation changes, and Panel B for downgrade recommendation changes. Panel C pools together upgrade and 
downgrade recommendation changes, and uses the absolute value of cumulative abnormal return (|𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]|) as 
the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate the significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is 1993-
2014.  
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Table 8 (continued): Market reactions to skilled analysts’ recommendation announcements 
 
Panel A: Upgrade recommendation changes (𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]) 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
    
 (-0.43) (0.42) (-0.58)     
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 
    0.002** 0.003** 0.004** 
     (2.24) (1.97) (2.07) 
|∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| 0.004
*** 0.005*** 0.005***  0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (8.14) (8.66) (6.51)  (8.26) (8.80) (6.65) 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002*  0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003** 
 (8.73) (2.88) (1.65)  (8.75) (3.04) (2.17) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014***  0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (28.77) (26.26) (18.49)  (28.61) (26.06) (17.89) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***  0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
 (4.12) (3.38) (2.94)  (3.77) (2.97) (2.87) 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003***  0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (2.85) (4.06) (2.63)  (3.05) (4.32) (2.79) 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002**  0.001*** 0.001* 0.002** 
 (3.51) (2.65) (2.32)  (3.11) (1.96) (2.18) 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 0.001 -0.000 0.001  0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.52) (-0.29) (0.65)  (1.46) (-0.45) (0.09) 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.000** -0.000 0.000  0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (2.08) (-0.30) (0.17)  (1.86) (-0.75) (0.19) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.003  0.000*** 0.004*** 0.003 
 (3.26) (4.24) (1.45)  (3.72) (4.23) (1.34) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002***  0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002** 
 (15.36) (3.47) (2.72)  (15.02) (3.18) (2.37) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-7.57) (-12.57) (-5.17)  (-7.44) (-12.40) (-5.16) 
Intercept -0.036*** -0.025*** (0.02)  -0.035*** -0.024*** (0.02) 
 (-7.75) (-4.78) (-1.49)  (-7.88) (-4.53) (-1.20) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Analyst FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
N 84,322 84,322 84,322  81,942 81,942 81,942 
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.051 0.041  0.044 0.049 0.038 
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Table 8 (continued): Market reactions to skilled analysts’ recommendation announcements 
 
Panel B: Downgrade recommendation changes (𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]) 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇  -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
    
 (-0.27) (-0.38) (-0.52)     
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 
    -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
     (-3.57) (-2.92) (-2.71) 
|∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| -0.008
*** -0.013*** -0.013***  -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (-12.31) (-13.96) (-10.11)  (-12.44) (-13.78) (-10.21) 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 -0.008*** -0.003** -0.002  -0.007*** -0.003* -0.001 
 (-7.47) (-2.02) (-0.73)  (-7.14) (-1.70) (-0.56) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.035***  -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.035*** 
 (-46.54) (-43.21) (-28.85)  (-46.69) (-43.30) (-29.02) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 -0.002 0.001 0.001  -0.002 -0.000 0.001 
 (-1.14) (0.41) (0.69)  (-1.50) (-0.15) (0.48) 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009***  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (-9.93) (-7.72) (-5.55)  (-9.90) (-7.90) (-5.20) 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*  0.002*** 0.002** 0.002 
 (3.24) (1.85) (1.87)  (3.34) (2.15) (1.64) 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 -0.001 -0.001 0.000  -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.61) (-0.83) (0.25)  (-1.99) (-0.93) (-0.86) 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.009***  -0.000*** -0.000 -0.011** 
 (-2.94) (-0.48) (-2.95)  (-2.85) (-0.51) (-2.55) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 -0.000*** 0.009*** 0.017***  -0.000*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 
 (-3.12) (-7.64) (4.76)  (-2.88) (6.99) (3.96) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.000  -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.000 
 (-15.72) (-3.20) (-0.27)  (-15.52) (-3.03) (-0.01) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (-12.87) (-2.62) (-6.90)  (-12.40) (-2.74) (-6.65) 
Intercept 0.113*** 0.103*** 0.023  0.117*** 0.104*** 0.014 
 (12.41) (9.78) (0.87)  (12.48) (9.63) (0.40) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Analyst FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
N 99,191 99,191 99,191  96,571 96,571 96,571 
Adjust R2 0.168 0.212 0.165   0.168 0.210 0.162 
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Table 8 (continued): Market reactions to skilled analysts’ recommendation announcements 
 
Panel C: Pooling upgrade and downgrade recommendation together (|𝐶𝐴𝑅[0, +1]|) 
 Cluster 1  Cluster 2 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇  0.001 0.001 0.001 
    
 (1.44) (1.22) (0.94)     
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 
    0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002* 
     (2.75) (2.75) (1.86) 
|∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙| 0.007
*** 0.009*** 0.009***  0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (35.91) (36.54) (31.28)  (35.30) (36.01) (30.75) 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 0.004*** 0.001** 0.001  0.004*** 0.002** 0.001* 
 (8.67) (2.17) (1.26)  (8.70) (2.35) (1.81) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.018***  0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (48.33) (44.05) (37.80)  (48.36) (44.23) (37.85) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (7.12) (6.63) (5.97)  (7.03) (6.49) (6.00) 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡‐𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (13.62) (13.06) (12.00)  (13.86) (13.17) (11.96) 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-4.81) (-4.74) (-4.02)  (-5.24) (-5.19) (-4.15) 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 0.001** 0.000 -0.000  0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (2.00) (0.39) (-0.10)  (2.15) (0.48) (0.03) 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.000*** 0.000 0.003**  0.000*** -0.000 0.004*** 
 (2.95) (0.04) (2.37)  (2.65) (-0.09) (2.59) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 0.000* 0.002*** -0.001  0.000* 0.002*** -0.001 
 (1.93) (3.24) (-0.52)  (1.87) (3.66) (-0.96) 
𝐿𝑛(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) 0.002*** -0.000 -0.001**  0.002*** -0.000 -0.001** 
 (16.31) (-0.14) (-2.08)  (15.91) (-0.28) (-2.48) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.001*** 0.000 0.001***  0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 (12.46) (0.37) (9.07)  (12.09) (0.66) (8.56) 
Intercept -0.061*** -0.050*** -0.023**  -0.061*** -0.051*** -0.017 
 (-16.21) (-11.02) (-2.17)  (-16.40) (-11.17) (-1.47) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Analyst FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
N 235,422 235,422 235,422  229,131 229,131 229,131 
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.251 0.188  0.204 0.250 0.186 
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Table 9: Subsample tests in post-publication periods 
 
Panel A reports Fama-French three-factors adjusted returns for quintile portfolios sorted by 11 anomalies. Panel B 
reports the average level and change of analyst consensus recommendations across quintile portfolios. Column “Rec” 
reports the average level of consensus recommendations and Column “ΔRec” reports the average change of consensus 
recommendations. We use the post publication periods for the test. ***, **, and * indicate the p-values of 1%, 5%, and 
10% or less, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Alpha       
 NSI CEI Accrual NOA AG IA 
Long 0.26% 0.10% 0.03% -0.08% 0.16% -0.01% 
 (3.20) (1.00) (0.29) (-0.56) (1.66) (-0.11) 
Short -0.49% -0.27% -0.33% -0.22% -0.20% -0.30% 
 (-4.89) (-2.12) (-2.49) (-1.79) (-1.31) (-1.89) 
Long – Short  0.75% 0.37% 0.36% 0.14% 0.36% 0.29% 
 (6.53) (2.28) (2.56) (0.67) (1.97) (1.64) 
 Distress O-score MOM GP ROA  
Long 0.09% -0.03% 0.24% 0.16% -0.02%  
 (0.93) (-0.29) (1.86) (1.02) (-0.28)  
Short 0.20% 0.16% -0.62% 0.60% -0.38%  
 (1.36) (1.07) (-3.02) (3.30) (-2.17)  
Long – Short  -0.11% -0.20% 0.86% -0.44% 0.35%  
 (-0.57) (-0.94) (2.85) (-1.78) (1.91)  
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Table 9 (continued): Subsample tests in post-publication periods 
 
Panel B: Single sort (Rec or ΔRec) 
 NSI  CEI  Accrual  NOA 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.63 -0.08  3.48 -0.05  3.70 -0.05  3.59 0.00 
2  3.65 -0.05  3.51 -0.02  3.68 -0.05  3.59 -0.01 
3  3.75 -0.04  3.63 -0.03  3.79 -0.02  3.63 0.00 
4  3.88 -0.01  3.76 0.00  3.90 -0.02  3.65 -0.02 
Short 4.02 0.00  3.84 0.03  4.05 -0.01  3.84 0.00 
Long - Short -0.39*** -0.08***  -0.36*** -0.07***  -0.35*** -0.03***  -0.25*** 0.00 
 AG  IA      
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec       
Long 3.58 -0.02  3.60 0.01 
      
2  3.57 0.01  3.67 -0.01 
      
3  3.63 -0.01  3.68 -0.01 
      
4  3.74 0.01  3.72 0.00 
      
Short 3.91 0.02  3.83 -0.01 
      
Long – Short  -0.33*** -0.04***  -0.23
*** 0.03*** 
      
 
 Distress  O-score  MOM  GP 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.70 0.00  3.72 0.00  3.91 0.06  3.72 -0.03 
2  3.73 0.00  3.72 0.01  3.78 0.00  3.79 -0.03 
3  3.73 0.02  3.70 0.00  3.74 -0.02  3.78 -0.01 
4  3.65 0.01  3.72 -0.01  3.73 -0.06  3.69 -0.02 
Short 3.53 -0.01  3.81 0.00  3.79 -0.16  3.62 -0.01 
Long – Short  0.17*** 0.01  -0.10*** 0.00  0.13*** 0.22***  0.10*** -0.02 
 ROA         
 Rec ΔRec          
Long 3.72 0.00          
2  3.72 0.01          
3  3.64 0.00          
4  3.53 -0.01          
Short 3.73 -0.03          
Long – Short  -0.01 0.03***          
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Table 10: Subsample tests based on firm size 
 
Panel A reports the average level and change of analyst consensus recommendations for quintile portfolios sorted by 
the two mispricing factors. MGMT (PERF) stands for the composite mispricing factor of the first (second) cluster. 
Column “Rec” reports the average level of consensus recommendations and Column “ΔRec” reports the average 
change of consensus recommendations. Panel B reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of portfolios 
sorted independently by anomaly characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At the end of 
each June, we sort stocks into three groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and 
independently into quintiles based on the composite mispricing measures. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top 
(bottom) tercile based on analyst consensus recommendations. Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued 
(overvalued) quintile based on anomaly characteristics. Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio 
where analyst recommendations are in congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the 
difference in abnormal returns between Inconsistent and Consistent portfolios. We use NYSE size breakpoints (30%) 
to classify stocks into small and big stocks. ***, **, and * indicate the p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10% or less, respectively. 
The sample period is 1993-2014.  
 
 Small Stocks  Big Stocks 
Panel A: Single sort (Rec or ΔRec) 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.60 -0.08  4.05 0.06  3.48 -0.06  3.85 0.03 
2 3.71 -0.07  3.94 -0.02  3.58 -0.03  3.78 0.01 
3 3.86 -0.04  3.81 -0.06  3.71 -0.01  3.72 0.00 
4 3.98 -0.04  3.73 -0.10  3.85 0.00  3.65 -0.03 
Short 4.15 0.00  3.76 -0.14  4.02 0.04  3.64 -0.07 
Long – Short  -0.56*** -0.07***  0.29*** 0.20***  -0.55*** -0.09***  0.20*** 0.11*** 
Panel B: Double sorts 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.52% 0.24%  0.61% 0.67%  0.17% 0.08%  0.26% 0.41% 
 (3.56) (2.46)  (4.24) (4.82)  (1.60) (0.89)  (2.07) (3.47) 
Short -0.86% -0.51%  -1.29% -0.61%  -0.71% -0.31%  -0.82% -0.36% 
 (-4.82) (-2.24)  (-5.64) (-3.82)  (-4.40) (-1.87)  (-4.54) (-3.07) 
Consistent 1.03%  1.22%  0.48%  0.63% 
 (4.12)  (5.90)  (2.50)  (3.17) 
Inconsistent 1.10%  1.96%  0.80%  1.23% 
 (5.35)  (7.50)  (4.15)  (4.82) 
Diff: Incon – Con 0.07%  0.74%  0.32%  0.60% 
 (0.29)  (2.95)  (1.33)  (2.68) 
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Table 11: Subsample tests based on institutional ownership 
 
Panel A reports the average level and change of analyst consensus recommendations for quintile portfolios sorted by 
the two mispricing factors. MGMT (PERF) stands for the composite mispricing factor of the first (second) cluster. 
Column “Rec” reports the average level of consensus recommendations and Column “ΔRec” reports the average 
change of consensus recommendations. Panel B reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of portfolios 
sorted independently by anomaly characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At the end of 
each June, we sort stocks into three groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and 
independently into quintiles based on the composite mispricing measures. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top 
(bottom) tercile based on analyst consensus recommendations. Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued 
(overvalued) quintile based on anomaly characteristics. Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio 
where analyst recommendations are in congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the 
difference in abnormal returns between Inconsistent and Consistent portfolios. We divide stocks into high and low 
institutional holdings each month according to the median institutional ownership (IOR) in the last quarter. ***, **, and 
* indicate the p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10% or less, respectively. The sample period is 1993-2014.  
 
 Low Institutional Ownership  High Institutional Ownership 
Panel A: Single sort (Rec or ΔRec) 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.51 -0.09  3.90 0.04  3.56 -0.05  3.92 0.04 
2 3.60 -0.07  3.79 -0.02  3.67 -0.05  3.86 0.02 
3 3.74 -0.03  3.69 -0.06  3.81 -0.02  3.81 -0.01 
4 3.88 -0.03  3.65 -0.07  3.94 -0.01  3.76 -0.04 
Short 4.05 -0.01  3.73 -0.14  4.12 0.04  3.75 -0.09 
Long – Short  -0.54*** -0.07***  0.18*** 0.18***  -0.56
*** -0.09***  0.17
*** 0.13*** 
Panel B: Double sorts 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.55% 0.28%  0.55% 0.63%  0.27% 0.08%  0.30% 0.39% 
 (3.64) (2.43)  (4.12) (4.59)  (2.35) (0.75)  (2.29) (3.46) 
Short -0.97% -0.65%  -1.23% -0.69%  -0.69% -0.18%  -0.90% -0.44% 
 (-5.35) (-2.94)  (-5.58) (-4.07)  (-4.24) (-1.17)  (-4.67) (-3.09) 
Consistent 1.20%  1.24%  0.45%  0.74% 
 (4.52)  (5.84)  (2.55)  (3.46) 
Inconsistent 1.25%  1.87%  0.77%  1.29% 
 (5.46)  (6.57)  (4.33)  (5.33) 
Diff: Incon – Con  0.05%  0.63%  0.32%  0.55% 
 (0.20)  (2.14)  (1.46)  (2.45) 
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Table 12: Subsample tests based on sentiment 
 
Panel A reports the average level and change of analyst consensus recommendations for quintile portfolios sorted by 
the two mispricing factors. MGMT (PERF) stands for the composite mispricing factor of the first (second) cluster. 
Column “Rec” reports the average level of consensus recommendations and Column “ΔRec” reports the average 
change of consensus recommendations. Panel B reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of portfolios 
sorted independently by anomaly characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At the end of 
each June, we sort stocks into three groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and 
independently into quintiles based on the composite mispricing measures. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top 
(bottom) tercile based on analyst consensus recommendations. Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued 
(overvalued) quintile based on anomaly characteristics. Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio 
where analyst recommendations are in congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the 
difference in abnormal returns between Inconsistent and Consistent portfolios. We use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
sentiment index to divide the entire sample into low and high sentiment periods using the sample median as the 
breakpoint. ***, **, and * indicate the p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10% or less, respectively. The sample period is 1993-
2014.  
 
 Low Sentiment  High Sentiment 
Panel A: Single sort (Rec or ΔRec) 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.60 -0.08  3.80 0.02  3.56 -0.06  3.98 0.05 
2 3.65 -0.06  3.78 0.00  3.67 -0.05  3.89 0.01 
3 3.70 0.00  3.73 -0.02  3.82 -0.04  3.81 -0.03 
4 3.75 -0.01  3.65 -0.05  3.97 -0.02  3.72 -0.08 
Short 3.89 0.01  3.64 -0.10  4.16 0.02  3.76 -0.12 
Long – Short  -0.29*** -0.09***  0.15*** 0.12***  -0.60*** -0.08***  0.22*** 0.17*** 
Panel B: Double sorts 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.35% 0.14%  0.27% 0.29%  0.38% 0.09%  0.46% 0.52% 
 (2.52) (1.29)  (1.80) (2.26)  (2.67) (0.88)  (2.68) (3.53) 
Short -0.43% -0.22%  -0.46% -0.36%  -1.09% -0.64%  -1.61% -0.68% 
 (-2.65) (-1.17)  (-1.73) (-2.26)  (-4.68) (-2.8)  (-6.19) (-3.65) 
Consistent 0.56%  0.63%  1.02%  1.14% 
 (2.36)  (2.41)  (3.68)  (4.12) 
Inconsistent 0.56%  0.75%  1.19%  2.14% 
 (2.41)  (2.22)  (4.52)  (6.18) 
Diff: Incon – Con 0.00%  0.12%  0.17%  0.99% 
 (0.00)  (0.41)  (0.56)  (3.30) 
 
  
61 
Online Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1: Subsample tests based on trading cost (daily percentage quoted spreads) 
 
Panel A reports the average level and change of analyst consensus recommendations for quintile portfolios sorted by 
the two mispricing factors. MGMT (PERF) stands for the composite mispricing factor of the first (second) cluster. 
Column “Rec” reports the average level of consensus recommendations and Column “ΔRec” reports the average 
change of consensus recommendations. Panel B reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of portfolios 
sorted independently by anomaly characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At the end of 
each June, we sort stocks into three groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and 
independently into quintiles based on the composite mispricing measures. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top 
(bottom) tercile based on analyst consensus recommendations. Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued 
(overvalued) quintile based on anomaly characteristics. Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio 
where analyst recommendations are in congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the 
difference in abnormal returns between Inconsistent and Consistent portfolios. We divide stocks into high and low 
trading cost groups each month, where trading cost is measured by the daily percentage quoted spread following 
Chung and Zhang (2014). ***, **, and * indicate the p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10% or less, respectively. The sample 
period is 1993-2014.  
 
 High Trading Cost  Low Trading Cost 
Panel A: Single sort (Rec or ΔRec) 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.60 -0.05  4.05 0.06  3.58 -0.05  4.03 0.05 
2 3.71 -0.05  3.95 -0.01  3.69 -0.05  3.92 0.00 
3 3.85 -0.04  3.82 -0.05  3.83 -0.03  3.80 -0.04 
4 3.98 -0.04  3.73 -0.08  3.96 -0.04  3.73 -0.07 
Short 4.15 -0.01  3.77 -0.11  4.13 -0.01  3.73 -0.12 
Long – Short  -0.56*** -0.04***  0.28*** 0.17***   -0.55*** -0.03***  0.30*** 0.17*** 
Panel B: Double sorts 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.50% 0.20%  0.58% 0.77%  0.28% 0.14%  0.30% 0.43% 
 (3.15) (1.82)  (3.82) (5.16)  (2.40) (1.47)  (2.12) (3.86) 
Short -0.65% -0.61%  -1.21% -0.77%  -0.83% -0.44%  -0.95% -0.37% 
 (-3.57) (-2.98)  (-5.58) (-4.87)  (-4.78) (-2.43)  (-4.66) (-2.17) 
Consistent 1.11%  1.35%  0.72%  0.67% 
 (4.53)  (5.89)  (3.29)  (2.71) 
Inconsistent 0.85%  1.98%  0.97%  1.38% 
 (3.99)  (7.46)  (4.76)  (5.08) 
Diff: Incon – Con -0.26%  0.62%  0.25%  0.71% 
 (-0.94)  (2.31)  (1.03)  (2.92) 
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Table A2: Subsample tests based on long-term institutional ownership 
 
Panel A reports the average level and change of analyst consensus recommendations for quintile portfolios sorted by 
the two mispricing factors. MGMT (PERF) stands for the composite mispricing factor of the first (second) cluster. 
Column “Rec” reports the average level of consensus recommendations and Column “ΔRec” reports the average 
change of consensus recommendations. Panel B reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of portfolios 
sorted independently by anomaly characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At the end of 
each June, we sort stocks into three groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and 
independently into quintiles based on the composite mispricing measures. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top 
(bottom) tercile based on analyst consensus recommendations. Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued 
(overvalued) quintile based on anomaly characteristics. Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio 
where analyst recommendations are in congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the 
difference in abnormal returns between Inconsistent and Consistent portfolios. We divide stocks into high and low 
institutional holdings each month according to the median institutional ownership (IOR) of dedicated institutions in 
the last quarter following classification of Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000). ***, **, and * indicate the p-
values of 1%, 5%, and 10% or less, respectively. The sample period is 1993-2014.  
 
 Low Institutional Ownership  High Institutional Ownership 
Panel A: Single sort (Rec or ΔRec) 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.53 -0.06  3.92 0.05  3.54 -0.07  3.90 0.03 
2 3.64 -0.04  3.85 0.02  3.66 -0.06  3.85 0.00 
3 3.76 -0.01  3.75 -0.02  3.79 -0.04  3.78 -0.03 
4 3.91 -0.01  3.68 -0.06  3.92 -0.03  3.73 -0.06 
Short 4.08 0.02  3.71 -0.10  4.10 0.02  3.73 -0.12 
Long – Short  -0.56*** -0.08***   0.21*** 0.15***   -0.56
*** -0.09***   0.17
*** 0.15*** 
Panel B: Double sorts 
 MGMT  PERF  MGMT  PERF 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.54% 0.27%  0.36% 0.41%  0.19% 0.04%  0.36% 0.46% 
 (3.84) (2.74)  (2.80) (3.54)  (1.63) (0.40)  (2.80) (3.88) 
Short -0.96% -0.66%  -1.11% -0.59%  -0.73% -0.16%  -0.98% -0.42% 
 (-5.64) (-3.15)  (-4.91) (-3.88)  (-4.53) (-0.90)  (-5.06) (-2.95) 
Consistent 1.21%  0.95%  0.35%  0.77% 
 (4.49)  (4.58)  (1.70)  (3.64) 
Inconsistent 1.23%  1.53%  0.77%  1.45% 
 (5.72)  (5.49)  (4.27)  (5.73) 
Diff: Incon – Con  0.05%  0.57%  0.42%  0.67% 
 (0.08)   (2.03)   (1.82)   (2.98) 
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Table A3: Informativeness of six new anomalies 
 
This table reports average returns and alphas on the long-short portfolios of the six new anomalies, including 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), max daily return in last month (MaxReturn), past 12-month turnover (Turnover), cash 
flow duration (Duration), long-run reversal (LMW), and market beta (Beta) based on the past 5-year estimation 
window. Panel A reports the raw returns and Panel B the Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas. The t-statistics are 
in parentheses. The sample period is 1993-2014. 
 
 IVOL MaxReturn Turnover Duration LMW Beta 
Panel A: Raw returns 
Long 0.94% 0.95% 1.04% 1.08% 1.39% 0.65% 
 (4.06) (4.04) (3.64) (2.87) (2.76) (2.82) 
Short 0.35% 0.70% 0.59% 0.88% 0.67% 1.23% 
 (0.67) (1.11) (1.1) (1.41) (1.63) (1.92) 
Long – Short  0.59% 0.25% 0.45% 0.20% 0.72% -0.58% 
 (1.42) (0.51) (1.29) (0.57) (2.47) (-1.17) 
Panel B: Alphas 
Long 0.34% 0.36% 0.37% 0.17% 0.30% 0.08% 
 (3.97) (3.62) (2.54) (1.04) (1.21) (0.80) 
Short -0.72% -0.46% -0.53% -0.25% -0.19% -0.05% 
 (-5.43) (-1.6) (-2.94) (-0.87) (-1.14) (-0.16) 
Long – Short 1.06% 0.82% 0.90% 0.42% 0.49% 0.12% 
 (5.66) (2.65) (4.88) (1.96) (1.82) (0.38) 
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Table A4: Analyst consensus recommendations for the six new anomalies 
 
This table reports the average level and change of consensus recommendations for quintile portfolios sorted by the six 
new anomaly variables, including idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), max daily return in last month (MaxReturn), past 
12-month turnover (Turnover), cash flow duration (Duration), long-run reversal (LMW) and market beta (Beta) using 
the past 5-year estimation window. Column “Rec” reports the average level of consensus recommendations and 
Column “ΔRec” reports the average change of consensus recommendations. ***, **, and * indicate the p-values of 1%, 
5%, and 10% or less, respectively. The sample period is 1993-2014.  
 
 IVOL  MaxReturn  Turnover  Duration 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Long 3.60 -0.03  3.66 -0.04  3.69 -0.05  3.68 -0.08 
2 3.74 -0.02  3.75 -0.04  3.75 -0.06  3.73 -0.06 
3 3.84 -0.03  3.81 -0.04  3.75 -0.05  3.79 -0.03 
4 3.90 -0.02  3.85 -0.05  3.80 -0.04  3.85 -0.01 
Short 3.93 -0.05  3.81 -0.12  3.82 -0.06  3.82 -0.10 
Long – Short  -0.33*** 0.02***  -0.15*** 0.08***  -0.13*** 0.01  -0.14*** 0.02*** 
 LMW  Beta       
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec       
Long 3.51 -0.15  3.64 -0.06       
2 3.61 -0.07  3.68 -0.04       
3 3.67 -0.02  3.74 -0.04       
4 3.78 0.00  3.79 -0.05       
Short 4.00 0.06  3.80 -0.06       
Long – Short  -0.49*** -0.20***  -0.17*** 0.00       
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Table A5: Abnormal returns of new anomaly portfolios conditional on analyst recommendations 
 
This table reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of portfolios sorted independently by the six new 
anomaly characteristics and the level of analyst consensus recommendations. At the end of each June, we sort stocks 
into three groups based on the level of analyst consensus recommendations, and independently into quintiles based on 
anomaly characteristics, including idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), max daily return in last month (MaxReturn), past 
12-month turnover (Turnover), cash flow duration (Duration), long-run reversal (LMW) and market beta (Beta) using 
the past 5-year estimation window. Up (Down) refers to stocks in the top (bottom) tercile based on analyst consensus 
recommendations. Long (Short) refers to stocks in the most undervalued (overvalued) quintile based on anomaly 
characteristics. Consistent (Inconsistent) refers to the long-short portfolio where analyst recommendations are in 
congruent with (contradictory to) the anomaly prescriptions. Diff is the difference in abnormal returns between 
Inconsistent and Consistent portfolios. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The sample period is 1993-2014.  
 
 IVOL  MaxReturn  Turnover  Duration 
 Up Down  Up Down  Up Down  Up Down 
Long 0.42% 0.35%  0.42% 0.36%  0.04% 0.39%  -0.02% 0.32% 
 (3.93) (3.91)  (3.46) (3.82)  (0.23) (2.94)  (-0.13) (2.09) 
Short -0.95% -0.45%  -0.90% -0.08%  -0.77% -0.47%  -0.65% 0.02% 
 (-6.08) (-2.95)  (-3.20) (-0.24)  (-4.21) (-1.75)  (-2.27) (0.06) 
Consistent 0.87%  0.50%  0.51%  -0.05% 
 (3.94)  (1.36)  (1.95)  (-0.15) 
Inconsistent 1.29%  1.26%  1.16%  0.97% 
 (6.56)  (4.37)  (6.20)  (4.27) 
Diff: Incon – Con 0.42%  0.76%  0.64%  1.02% 
 (2.17)  (3.29)  (2.34)  (3.68) 
 LMW  Beta     
 Up Down  Up Down       
Long 0.23% 0.30%  0.11% 0.00%       
 (0.90) (1.09)  (0.92) (-0.01)       
Short -0.28% -0.12%  -0.44% 0.23%       
 (-1.69) (-0.48)  (-1.69) (0.58)       
Consistent 0.34%  -0.11%     
 (1.05)  (-0.27)     
Inconsistent 0.58%  0.44%     
 (1.98)  (1.62)     
Diff: Incon – Con 0.24%  0.55%     
 (0.86)  (2.02)     
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Table A6: Unconditional Return Predictability of Consensus Analyst Recommendations 
 
This table reports the monthly Fama-French three-factor alphas of quintile portfolios sorted on consensus analyst 
recommendations. At the beginning of every quarter (month), we sort stocks into quintiles based on the level or change 
of recommendations observed at the last quarter (month) end, and re-balance the portfolio quarterly (monthly). Panel 
A (B) reports the results for quarterly (monthly) re-balanced portfolios and t-statistics are reported for the long minus 
short portfolios.  
 
Panel A: Quarterly rebalanced portfolios 
 1993-2000  2000 - 2007  2008 - 2014  1993 - 2014 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Short 0.46% 0.60%  1.00% 0.74%  0.94% 1.10%  0.80% 0.82% 
2  0.76% 1.10%  0.83% 0.99%  1.06% 0.94%  0.88% 1.01% 
3  0.88% 0.91%  1.04% 0.80%  1.09% 1.02%  1.00% 0.91% 
4  0.40% 0.94%  0.55% 0.83%  0.92% 1.05%  0.62% 0.94% 
Long 0.31% 1.02%  0.56% 0.85%  0.82% 1.07%  0.56% 0.98% 
Long – Short  -0.14% 0.43%  -0.44% 0.11%  -0.12% -0.03%  -0.23% 0.16% 
t-stat (-1.27) (2.17)  (-1.32) (0.53)  (-1.47) (-0.31)  (-1.64) (1.76) 
Panel B: Monthly rebalanced portfolios 
 1993-2000  2000 - 2007  2008 - 2014  1993 - 2014 
 Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec  Rec ΔRec 
Short 0.46% 0.48%  1.01% 0.74%  0.93% 1.01%  0.80% 0.76% 
2  0.68% 1.00%  0.71% 0.92%  1.03% 0.95%  0.81% 0.96% 
3  0.90% 0.96%  1.13% 0.80%  1.08% 1.03%  1.03% 0.93% 
4  0.46% 0.79%  0.58% 0.83%  0.96% 1.04%  0.66% 0.89% 
Long 0.52% 1.17%  0.64% 0.87%  0.86% 1.18%  0.67% 1.07% 
Long – Short  0.06% 0.69%  -0.37% 0.13%  -0.06% 0.16%  -0.13% 0.31% 
t-stat (-0.34) (2.79)  (-0.99) (0.59)  (-1.16) (0.67)  (-0.77) (2.85) 
 
